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Conformity and Dissent 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Much of the time, human beings do what others do. This is perfectly sensible, because the 
actions and statements of other people convey valuable information about what should be 
done. In addition, most people want the good opinion of others, and this desire promotes 
conformity. But conformity can lead both groups and institutions in unfortunate and even 
catastrophic directions. The most serious problem is that by following others, people fail 
to disclose what they know and believe, thus depriving society of important information. 
Those who dissent, and who reject the pressures imposed by others, perform valuable 
social functions, often at their own expense, material or nonmaterial. These points are 
illustrated by reference to theoretical and empirical work on conformity, cascades, and 
group polarization.  An understanding of the role of conformity and dissent casts new 
light on a variety of legal issues, including the expressive function of law; the institutions 
of the American constitution; the functions of free speech in wartime; the debate over the 
composition of the federal judiciary; and affirmative action in higher education. 
 
 
                                                
 
 “If I were to choose between living in a society which enjoys freedom of expression, but 
not having the right myself, or enjoying the right in a society which does not have it, I would 
have no hesitation in judging that my own personal interest is better served by the first option.”1 
 
 “As soon as a person is in the midst of a group he is no longer indifferent to it. He may 
stand in a wholly unequivocal relation to an object when alone; but as soon as a group and its 
direction are present he ceases to be determined solely by his own coordinates. In some way he 
refers the group to himself and himself to the group. He might react to the group in many 
different ways; he might adopt its direction, compromise with it, or oppose it; he might even 
decide to disregard it. But even in the latter instance (which superficially seems to be an ‘absence 
 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of 
Political Science, University of Chicago. For valuable comments, I am grateful to Jacob Gersen, Reid 
Hastie, David Hirshleifer, Christine Jolls, Catharine MacKinnon, Martha Nussbaum, Susan Moller Okin, 
Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Lior Strahilevitz, Adrian Vermeule, and Richard Zeckhauser.  
1 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain 39 (1994). 
2 
of group influence’) there is a clear and determined reference to the group as fully as in the 
preceding cases.”2 
 
“Justice Marshall brought a special perspective. . . . His was the mouth of a man who 
knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice. . . . I have been perhaps most personally 
affected by Justice Marshall as a raconteur . . . . Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I still 
catch myself looking expectantly for his raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just 
once more, another story that would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world.”3 
 
“A child, however, who had no important job and could only see things as his eyes 
showed them to him, went up to the carriage. ‘The Emperor is naked,’ he said.”4 
 
“[W]hile individual ideology and panel composition both have important effects on a 
judge’s vote, the ideology of one’s colleagues is a better predictor of one’s vote than one’s own 
ideology.”5 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
How do people influence each other? What are the social functions of dissenters, 
malcontents, and skeptics? How do the answers to these questions bear on law and 
policy, and on the design of private and public institutions?  
 
Consider some clues: 
 
—A large number of judicial votes and decisions were investigated to see if it 
matters whether a panel, on a federal court of appeals, includes two judges, or instead 
three, appointed by a President of the same party.6 It is tempting to suggest that this 
should not matter at all; two judges, after all, are able to produce a majority decision. But 
this suggestion turns out to be wrong. A panel with three judges appointed by Republican 
presidents is much more likely than a panel with two to reverse an environmental 
decision at the behest of an industry challenger.7 A group of three like-minded judges 
behaves very differently from a group with more diverse views. No less remarkably, a 
single Democratic judge, sitting with two Republicans, turns out to be more likely to vote 
                                                 
2 Solomon Asch, Social Psychology 483 (1952). 
3 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1217, 
1217, 1220 (1992). 
4 See Hans Christian Anderson, The Emperor’s New Suit, in Hans Christian Anderson, Shorter Tales (Jean 
Hersholt trans. 1948; originally published 1837). 
5 Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717, 1764 
(1997). 
6 The statements in this paragraph are based on my independent research, presented below, and on Richard 
L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 Va L Rev 1717, 1755 (1997). To 
the same effect, see Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine, 107 Yale LJ 2155 (1998) (finding that a panel of three Republican judges is far more likely to 
reject agency action, in order to reach a conclusion that would be predicted of that panel on political 
grounds, than a panel of two Republicans and one Democrat). 
7 See the data discussed below; see also Revesz, supra note, at 1754-55 (also finding that a panel of three 
judges appointed by the president of the same party behaves differently from a panel with judges appointed 
by presidents of different parties) . 
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in favor of an industry challenge to a regulation than a single Republican, sitting with two 
Democrats.8 It is not entirely wrong to conclude that when sitting with Republicans, 
Democratic judges vote like Republicans, and that when sitting with Democrats, 
Republican judges vote like Democrats. But this conclusion is itself misleading, because 
how Democrats vote, and how Republicans vote, is very much dependent on whether 
they are sitting with one or two judges appointed by presidents of the same party.9  
 
—Ordinary citizens were asked to say, as individuals, how much a defendant 
should be punished for specified misconduct.10 Their responses were measured on a scale 
of 0 to 8, where 0 meant no punishment at all and 8 meant “extremely severe” 
punishment.11 After recording their individual judgments, people were sorted into six-
person juries, which were asked to deliberate and to reach unanimous verdicts. When the 
individual jurors favored little punishment, the group showed a "leniency shift," meaning 
a rating that was systematically lower than the median rating of individual members 
before they started to talk with one another.12 But when individual jurors favored strong 
punishment, the group as a whole produced a "severity shift," meaning a rating that was 
systematically higher than the median rating of individual members before they started to 
talk.13 The direction and the extent of the shift were determined by the median ranking of 
individual jurors, and because one or two dissenters from the majority view could shift 
the median, they could make a significant difference. 
 
My principal claim in this Article is that for each of us, conformity is often a 
rational course of action, but when all or most of us conform, society can end up making 
large mistakes. One reason we conform is that we often lack much information of our 
own, and the decisions of others provide the best available information about what should 
be done.14 The central problem is that widespread conformity deprives the public of 
information that it needs to have. Conformists are often thought to be protective of social 
interests, keeping quiet for the sake of the group, while dissenters tend to be seen as 
selfish individualists, embarking on projects of their own. But in an important sense, the 
opposite is closer to the truth. In many situations, dissenters benefit others, while 
conformists benefit themselves.  
 
In a well-functioning democracy, institutions reduce the risks that accompany 
conformity, in part because they meet conformity with dissent, and hence increase the 
likelihood that more information will emerge, to the benefit of all. A high-level official 
                                                 
8 See id. at 1752. 
9 Id. at 1752, 1754. 
10 See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars, 100 Colum L 
Rev 1139 (2001). 
11 Id. at 1150. 
12 Id. at 1152, 1154-55. 
13 Id.  
14 See the discussion of imitation as a fast and frugal heuristic in Joseph Henrich et al., What Is the Role of 
Culture in Bounded Rationality, in Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 343, 344 (Gerd Gigerenzer 
and Richard Selten eds. 2002) (“Cultural transmission capacities allow individuals to shortcut the costs of 
search, experimentation, and data processing algorithms, and instead benefit from the cumulative 
experience stored in the minds (and observed in the behavior) of others.”). 
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during World War II attributed the successes of the Allies, and the failures of Hitler and 
the other Axis powers, to the greater ability of citizens in democracies to scrutinize and 
dissent, and hence to improve past and proposed courses of action.15 Dissent and scrutiny 
were possible because skeptics were not punished by the law and because informal 
punishments, in the form of social pressures, were relatively weak. I will suggest that an 
understanding of group influences, and their potentially harmful effects, casts new light 
on a wide range of issues, including the nature of the American constitutional structure; 
the functions of bicameralism; the sources of ethnic hostility and political radicalism; the 
importance of civil liberties in wartime and during social panics and witch-hunts; the 
performance of juries; the effects of diversity on the federal judiciary; affirmative action 
in higher education; and the potentially large consequences of law even when it is never 
enforced.  
 
Throughout I focus on two influences on individual belief and behavior. The first 
involves the information conveyed by the actions and statements of other people. If a 
number of people seem to believe that some proposition is true, there is reason to believe 
that that proposition is in fact true. Most of what we think—about facts, morality, and 
law—is a product not of first-hand knowledge, but of what we learn from what others do 
and think. This is true even though they too may be merely following the crowd. As we 
shall see, this phenomenon can create serious problems for the system of precedent, as 
when courts of appeals follow previous courts that are in turn following their 
predecessors, creating a danger of widespread, self-perpetuating error. And of course 
some people have more influence than others, simply because the decisions of those 
people convey more information; we are especially likely to follow those who have 
special expertise, those who seem most like us, those who fare best, or those whom we 
otherwise have reason to trust.16 
 
The second influence is the pervasive human desire to have and to retain the good 
opinion of others. If a number of people seem to believe something, there is reason not to 
disagree with them, at least not in public. The desire to maintain the good opinion of 
others breeds conformity and squelches dissent, especially but not only in groups that are 
connected by bonds of affection, which can therefore impair group performance. We 
shall see that close-knit groups, discouraging conflict and disagreement, often do badly 
for that very reason. In any case much of human behavior is a product of social 
influences. For example, employees are far more likely to file suit if members of the 
same workgroup have also done so17; teenage girls who see that other teenagers are 
having children are more likely to become pregnant themselves18; the perceived behavior 
                                                 
15 See Luther Gulick, Administrative Reflections from World War II (1948). Irving Janis, Groupthink (2d 
ed. 1985), can be seen as a generalization of this theme. 
16 See Daniel Goldstein et al., Why and When Do Simple Heuristics Work?, in Bounded Rationality, note 
supra, at 174-76; Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson, Norms and Bounded Rationality, in id. at 284-87. 
17 See Harold H. Gardner, Nathan L. Kleinman, and Richard J. Butler, Workers’ Compensation and Family 
and Medical Leave Act Claim Contagion, 20 J Risk and Uncertainty 89, 101-110 (2000) 
18 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen & Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock 
Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q.J. Econ. 277 (1996). 
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of others has a large effect on the level of violent crime19; broadcasters mimic one 
another, producing otherwise inexplicable fads in programming20; lower courts 
sometimes do the same, especially in highly technical areas, and hence judicial mistakes 
may never be corrected.21 
 
We should not lament social influences or wish them away. Much of the time, 
people do better when they take close account of what others do. Some of the time, we 
even do best to follow others blindly. But social influences also diminish the total level of 
information within any group, and they threaten, much of the time, to lead individuals 
and institutions in the wrong directions. Dissent can be an important corrective; many 
groups and institutions have too little of it.22 As we shall see, conformists are free-riders, 
whereas dissenters often confer benefits on others; and it is tempting to free-ride. As we 
shall also see, social pressures are likely to lead groups of like-minded people to extreme 
positions. When groups become caught up in hatred and violence, it is rarely because of 
economic deprivation23 or primordial suspicions24; it is far more often a product of the 
informational and reputational influences discussed here.25 Indeed, unjustified extremism 
frequently results from a “crippled epistemology,” in which extremists react to a small 
subset of relevant information, coming mostly from one another.26  
 
Similar processes occur in less dramatic forms. Many large-scale shifts within 
legislatures, bureaucracies, and courts are best explained by reference to social 
influences. When a legislature suddenly shows concern with some formerly neglected 
problem—for example, hazardous waste dumps or corporate misconduct—the concern is 
often a product of conformity effects, not of real engagement with the problem. Of course 
the new concern might be justified. But if social influences are encouraging people to 
conceal information that they have, or if the blind are leading the blind, serious problems 
are likely. There is a further point. With relatively small "shocks," similar groups can be 
lead, by social pressures, to dramatically different beliefs and actions. When societies 
                                                 
19 See Edward Glaeser, E. Sacerdote, and Jose Scheinkman, Crime and Social Interactions, 111 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 507 (1996). 
20 See Robert Kennedy, Strategy Fads and Strategic Positioning: An Empirical Test for Herd Behavior in 
Prime-Time Television Programming, J. Industrial Economics (2002). 
21 See Andrew F. Daughtety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment, 1 Am Law and Ec. Rev. 
158 (1999). 
22 Hence Mill’s claim that “the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing 
the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, stil more 
than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for 
truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of 
truth, produced by its collision with error.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 
On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government 85 (H.B. Acton ed. 1972) 
23 See Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is 
There a Causal Connection? (unpublished manuscript 2002).  
24 See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J Legal 
Stud 623, 648 (1998). 
25 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why They Hate Us: The Role of Social Dynamics, 25 Harv J Law and Public 
Policy 429 (2002). 
26 See Russell Hardin, The Crippled Epistemology of Extremism, in Political Rationality and Extremism 3, 
16 (Albert Breton et al. eds. 2002). 
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differ, or when large-scale changes occur over time, the reason often lies not where we 
usually look, but in small and sometimes elusive factors.27  
  
An appreciation of informational influences, and of people’s concern for the good 
opinion of others, helps to show how, and when, law can alter behavior without being 
enforced—and merely by virtue of the signal that it provides.28 The central point here is 
that law can provide reliable evidence both about what should be done and about what 
most people think should be done. In either case, it can convey a great deal of relevant 
information.29 Consider bans on public smoking and on sexual harassment. If people 
think that the law is speaking for the view of most or all, potential violators are less likely 
to engage in smoke or to engage in sexual harassment. Potential victims are also more 
likely to take the steps to enforce the law privately, as, for example, through reminding 
people of their legal responsibilities, and insisting that violators come into compliance. In 
this light we can better understand the much-disputed claim that the law has an 
“expressive function.”30 By virtue of that function, law can even stop or accelerate a 
social cascade.31 Here too the areas of cigarette smoking and sexual harassment are 
relevant examples. But if would-be violators are part of a dissident subcommunity, they 
might well be able to resist law’s expressive effect; fellow dissidents can band together 
and encourage one another to violate the law. Indeed, informational and reputational 
factors can even encourage widespread noncompliance, as, for example, in drug use and 
failure to comply with the tax laws.32 The law’s expressive power is partly a function of 
its moral authority, and when law lacks that authority within a subcommunity, its signal 
may be irrelevant or even counterproductive. 
 
This Article is divided into seven parts. Parts II, III, and IV investigate social 
science evidence involving, respectively, conformity, cascades, and group polarization. A 
unifying theme is that in all three contexts, individuals are suppressing their private 
signals—about what is true and what is right—and that this suppression can cause 
significant social harm. Groups of like-minded people are especially vulnerable on this 
count. Part V focuses on the expressive function of law and in particular on the 
phenomenon of “compliance without enforcement.” Part VI catalogues some implications 
                                                 
27 See Joseph Henrich, What is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in Bounded Rationality: The 
Adaptive Toolbox 353-54 (2001), for an entertaining outline in connection with food choice decisions. For 
example: “Many Germans believe that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly; they also believe that 
putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy. The English, however, rather enjoy a cold drink of water after some 
cherries; and Americans love icy refreshments. ” Id. at 353. See also Paul Omerod, Butterfly Economics 
(1993), for a popular account. 
28 See Robert Kagan and Jerome Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in 
Smoking Policy (Robert Rabin and Stephen Sugarman eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
29 See Richard McAdams, Norms Theory: An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Oregon L. Rev. 
339 (2000). 
30 Mathew Adler, Expressivist Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U Pa L Rev 1363 (2000); 
Symposium, The Expressive Dimension of Governmental Action: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, 60 
Maryland L. Rev. 465 (2001). 
31 See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev 
607 (2000). 
32 See Robert Kagan and Jerome Skolnick, in Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in 
Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and Culture 78 (Robert Radin ed. 1999). 
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of social influences for constitutionalism, judicial confirmations, and affirmative action in 
higher education. Here I urge that the principal contribution of the framers of the 
American Constitution lay not in their endorsement of deliberative democracy, but in 
their insistence that diversity is an affirmative good, likely to improve deliberation. This 
enthusiasm for diversity helps account for the systems of checks and balances and 
federalism. I also suggest that it is important to attempt to provide a mix of views on the 
federal bench; indeed, consideration should be given to increasing the likelihood that 
panels, on courts of appeals, contain judges appointed by president of different parties. I 
urge as well that in those cases in which racial diversity will improve discussion, it is 
entirely legitimate for colleges and universities to attempt to promote racial diversity. 
Part VII is a brief conclusion. 
 
II. Conformity and Independence 
 
Why, and when, do people do what others do? To answer this question, we need 
to distinguish between hard questions and easy ones. Intuition suggests that when people 
are confident that they are right, they will be more willing to do what they think best and 
to reject the views of the crowd. Several sets of experiments confirm this intuition, but 
they also offer some significant twists. Most important, they suggest three points that I 
will emphasize throughout: 
 
1. Those who are confident and firm will have particular influence, and can lead 
otherwise identical groups in dramatically different directions.33 
2. People are extremely vulnerable to the unanimous views of others and hence a 
single dissenter, or voice of sanity, is likely to have a huge impact.34 
3. If people are, by our lights, from some kind of “out group,” they are far less likely 
to influence us, even on the simplest questions.35 And if people are part of a group 
to which we also belong, they are far more likely to influence us, on both easy and 
hard questions.36  
 
My ultimate goal is to see how these points bear on the behavior of those involved 
in making, enforcing, and interpreting law. But let us begin by reviewing some classic 
studies. 
 
A. Hard Questions 
 
                                                 
33 See p. below. 
34 See p. below. Note a parallel finding: A minority is especially likely to have influence if it consists of 
more than one person and if all members of the minority group are in basic agreement. See Robert Baron et 
al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 81-82 (1999). 
35 Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What to think By Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorization and he 
Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity, and Group Polarization, 29 British J. Soc. Psych. 97 (1990). 
Group membership and self-categorization are emphasized in John Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social 
Group: A Self-Categorization Theory 42-67 (1987). 
36 Dominic Abrams et al., supra note, at 97-110. 
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In the 1930s, the psychologist Muzafer Sherif conducted some simple 
experiments on sensory perception.37 Subjects were placed in a very dark room and a 
small pinpoint of light was positioned at some distance in front of them. Because of a 
perceptual illusion, the light, which was actually stationary, appeared to move. On each 
of several trials, Sherif asked people to estimate the distance that the light had moved. 
When polled individually, subjects did not agree with one another, and their answers 
varied from one trial to another. This is not surprising; because the light did not move, 
any judgment about distance was a stab in the dark. But Sherif found some striking 
results when subjects were asked to act in small groups. Here the individual judgments 
converged and a group norm, establishing the right distance, quickly developed. Indeed, 
the norm remained stable within groups across different trials, thus leading to a situation 
in which different groups made, and were committed to, quite different judgments.38 
There is an important clue here about how similar groups, indeed similar nations, can 
converge on very different beliefs and actions simply because of modest and even 
arbitrary variations in starting points.  
 
When Sherif added a confederate—his own ally, unbeknownst to subjects—
something else happened.39 The judgment of the confederate, typically much higher or 
much lower than those made by individual subjects, helped produced correspondingly 
higher or lower judgments within the group. The large lesson is that at least in cases 
involving difficult questions of fact, judgments “could be imposed by an individual who 
had no coercive power and no special claim to expertise, only a willingness to be 
consistent and unwavering in the face of others’ uncertainty.”40 Perhaps more remarkable 
still, the group’s judgments became thoroughly internalized, so that subjects would 
adhere to them even when reporting on their own, even a year later, and even when 
participating in new groups whose members offered different judgments.41 The initial 
judgments were also found to have effects across “generations.” In an experiment in 
which fresh subjects were introduced and others retired, so that eventually all participants 
were new to the situation, the original group judgment tended to stick, even after the 
person who was originally responsible for it had been long gone.42  
 
What accounts for these results? The most obvious answer points to the 
informational influences produced by other people’s judgments. After all, the apparent 
movements are a perceptual illusion, and the system of perception does not readily assign 
distances to those movements. In those circumstances, people are especially likely to be 
swayed by a confident and consistent group member. This finding has implications 
outside of the laboratory and for classrooms, courtrooms, bureaucracies, and legislatures. 
If uninformed people are trying to decide whether global warming is a serious problem, 
                                                 
37 Muzafer Sherif, An Experimental Approach to the Study of Attitudes, 1 Sociometry 90 (1937). A good 
outline can be found in Lee Ross and Richard Nisbet, The Person and the Situation 28-30 (1991). 
38 Id. at 29. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 29-30. 
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or whether they should be concerned about existing levels of arsenic in drinking water, 
they are likely to be responsive to the views of confident and consistent others.43  
 
What is true for factual issues is true for moral, political, and legal issues as well. 
Suppose that a group of legislators is trying to decide how to handle a highly technical 
issue. If a “confederate” is planted among the group, showing considerable confidence, 
she is highly likely to be able to move the group in his preferred direction. So too if she is 
not a confederate at all, but simply an ordinary legislator with great confidence on the 
issue at hand. If judges are trying to resolve a complex issue on which they lack certainty, 
they too are vulnerable to conformity effects.44 And for judicial panels as well, Sherif-
type effects can be expected on technical matters if one judge is confident and seems 
expert. The problem is that the so-called specialists may have biases and agendas of their 
own, leading to large errors. Note that there is an important qualification to these claims, 
to which I will return: Sherif’s conformity findings significantly decrease if the 
experimenter uses a confederate whose membership in a different social group is made 
salient to subjects.45  
 
B. Easy Questions 
 
But what if perception does provide reliable guidance? What if people have good 
reason to know the right answer? The leading experiments, conducted by Solomon Asch, 
explored whether people would be willing to overlook the apparently unambiguous 
evidence of their own senses.46 In these experiments, the subject was placed into a group 
of seven to nine people who seemed to be other subjects in the experiment but who were 
actually Asch’s confederates. The simple task was to “match” a particular line, shown on 
a large white card, to one of the three “comparison lines” that was identical to it in length. 
The two non-matching lines were substantially different, with the differential varying 
from an inch and three quarters to three quarters of an inch.  
 
In the first two rounds of the Asch experiments, everyone agrees about the right 
answer. “The discriminations are simple; each individual monotonously calls out the 
same judgment.”47 But “suddenly this harmony is disturbed at the third round.”48 All 
other group members make what is obviously, to the subject and to any reasonable 
person, a clear error, matching the line at issue to one that is conspicuously longer or 
shorter. In these circumstances, the subject, in all cases showing initial confusion and 
disbelief at the apparent mistakes of others, has a choice: He can maintain his 
independent judgment or instead accept the view of the unanimous majority. A large 
                                                 
43 See the discussion of authority in Robert Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion 208-36 
(1993). For evidence that minority views can be influential if they are held by consistent, confident people, 
see Robert Bray et al., Social Influence By Group Members With Minority Opinions, 43 J Personality and 
Social Psych. 78 (1982). 
44 See section below. 
45 Abrams, supra note, at 99-104. 
46 See the overview in Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social Animal 
13 (Elliott Aronson ed. 1995).  
47 Solomon Asch, Social Psychology 453 (1952). 
48 Asch, Opinion and Social Pressures, supra note, at 13. 
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number of people end up yielding at least once in a series of trials. When asked to decide 
on their own, subjects erred less than 1 percent of the time; but in rounds in which group 
pressure supported the incorrect answer, subjects erred 36.8% of the time.49 Indeed, in a 
series of twelve questions, no less than 70% of subjects went along with the group, and 
defied the evidence of their own senses, at least once.50 Conformity experiments of this 
kind have now produced 133 total sets of results from seventeen countries, including 
Zaire, Germany, France, Japan, Lebanon, and Kuwait.51 A meta-analysis of these studies 
uncovers a variety of refinements on Asch’s basic findings, but his basic conclusion has 
held up. For all results, the mean percentage error is 29%.52 People in some nations, with 
“conformist” cultures, do err more than people in other nations, with more “individualist” 
cultures.53 The variations are real, but the overall pattern of errors—with subjects 
conforming between 20% and 40% of the time—does not show huge differences across 
nations. 
 
Note that Asch’s findings contain two conflicting lessons. First, a significant 
number of people are independent all or much of the time. About 25% of people are 
consistently independent,54 and about two-thirds of total individual answers do not 
conform. Hence “there is evidence of extreme individual differences” in susceptibility to 
group influences, with some subjects remaining completely independent, and others 
“going with the majority without exception.”55 While independent subjects “present a 
striking spectacle to an observer,” giving “the appearance of being unshakable,”56 other 
people show a great deal of anxiety and confusion.57 Second, most subjects, at least some 
of the time, are willing to yield to the group even on an apparently easy question on 
which they have direct and unambiguous evidence. For present purposes, the latter 
finding is the most important. 
 
C. Reasons and Blunders 
 
Why do people sometimes ignore the evidence of their own senses? The two 
principal explanations involve information and peer pressure. Some of Asch’s subjects 
seem to have thought that the unanimous confederates must be right; but other people, 
though believing that group members were unaccountably mistaken, were unwilling to 
make, in public, what those members would see as an error. In Asch’s own studies, 
several conformists said, in private interviews, that their own opinions must have been 
wrong58—a point that suggests that information, rather than peer pressure, is what was 
                                                 
49 Id. at 16.  
50 Id. 
51 See Rod Bond and Peter Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch’s Line 
Judgment Task, 119 Psych. Bulletin 111, 116 (1996). 
52 Id. at 118. 
53 Id. at 128. 
54 Ronald Friend et al., A Puzzling Misinterpretation of the Asch “Conformity” Study, 20 European J of 
Social Psych 29, 37 (1990). 
55 Solomon Asch, Social Psychology, supra note, at 457-58. 
56 Id. at 466.  
57 Id. at 470. 
58 See Asch, supra. 
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moving them.59 This informational account is strengthened by one study in which people 
recorded their answers anonymously but gave nearly as many wrong answers as they had 
under Asch’s own conditions.60 A similar study finds that conformity is not lower when 
the subject’s response is unavailable to the majority.61 On the other hand, these are 
unusual results, and experimenters generally find significantly reduced error, in the same 
basic circumstances as Asch’s experiments, when the subject is asked to give a purely 
private answer.62 In the same way, easily identifiable conformity or deviation has been 
found to produce higher conformity.63 These findings suggest that peer pressure matters 
as well.  
 
Asch’s own conclusion was that his results raised the possibility that “the social 
process is polluted” by the “dominance of conformity.”64 He added, “That we have found 
the tendency to conformity in our society so strong that reasonably intelligent and well-
meaning young people are willing to call white black is a matter of concern.”65 As I have 
noted, Asch’s experiments produce broadly similar findings across nations, and so in 
Asch’s sentence just quoted, the word “society” could well be replaced with the word 
“world.” But I want to stress another point here: Many people are not willing to disclose 
their own information to the group, even though it is in the group’s interest, most of the 
time, to learn what it is known or thought by individual members. To see this point, 
imagine a group almost all of whose members believe something to be true even though 
it is false. Imagine too that one member of the group, or a very few members of the 
group, know the truth. Are they likely to correct the dominant view? If Asch’s findings 
generalize, the answer is that they may not be. They are not reticent because they are 
irrational. They are making is a perfectly sensible response to the simple fact that the 
dominant view is otherwise—a fact that suggests either that the small minority is wrong 
or that they are likely to risk their own reputations if they insist that they are right. As we 
shall see, Asch’s findings help explain why groups can end up making unfortunate and 
even self-destructive decisions. 
 
Would those findings apply to judgments about morality, policy, and law? It 
seems jarring to think that people would yield to a unanimous group when the question 
involves a moral, political, or legal issue on which they have great confidence. But if 
Asch is correct, such yielding should be expected, at least some of the time. We will find 
powerful evidence that this happens within federal courts of appeals.66 The deadening 
effect of public opinion was of course a central concern of John Stuart Mill, who insisted 
that protection “against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough,” and that it was also 
important to protect “against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the 
                                                 
59 It would be possible to question this explanation, however, on the ground that some of these conformists 
might have been embarrassed to admit that they were vulnerable to peer influence, entirely apart from a 
belief that the peers might have been right. 
60 See Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance 149-50 (2000). 
61 Bond and Smith, supra note, at 124. 
62 See Aronson, supra note, at 23-24. 
63 See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 66 (1999). 
64 Asch, supra note, at 21. 
65 Id.  
66 See below. 
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tendency of society to impose, by other mans than civil penalties, its own ideas and 
practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them . . .”67 Mill’s focus here is 
on the adverse effects of coerced conformity not only on the individuals who are thus 
tyrannized, but also on society itself, which is deprived of important information.68  
 
D. How To Increase (or Decrease) Conformity 
 
 What factors increase or decrease conformity? Consistent with Sherif’s findings, 
people are less likely to conform if they have high social status or are extremely 
confident about their own views.69 They are more likely to conform if the task is difficult 
or if they are frightened.70 Consider also the following: 
 
1. Financial rewards for correct answers affect performance, and in two different 
ways.71 When people stand to make money if they are right, the rate of conformity is 
significantly decreased in the same basic condition as the Asch experiments, if the task is 
easy. People are less willing to follow group members when they stand to profit from a 
correct answer. But there is a striking difference when the experiments are altered to 
make the underlying task difficult. In that event, a financial incentive, rewarding correct 
answers, actually increases conformity. People are more willing to follow to crowd when 
they stand to profit from a correct answer if the question is hard. Perhaps most strikingly, 
the level of conformity is about the same, when financial incentives were absent, in low-
difficulty and high-difficulty tasks—but the introduction of financial rewards splits the 
results on those tasks dramatically apart, with significantly decreased conformity for low-
difficulty tasks and significantly-increased conformity for high-difficulty tasks.72  
 
These results have simple explanations. A certain number of people, in the Asch 
experiments, actually know the right answer, and give conforming answers only because 
it is not worthwhile to reject the shared view of others in public. But when a financial 
incentive is offered, peer pressure is outweighed by the possibility of material gain. The 
simple lesson here is that an economic reward can counteract the effects of social 
pressures. By contrast, difficult tasks leave people with a great deal of uncertainty about 
whether they are right. In such circumstances, people are all the more likely to give 
weight to the views of others, simply because those views are the most reliable source of 
information. Consider in this regard the parallel finding that people’s confidence in their 
own judgments is directly related to the confidence shown by the experimenter’s 
confederates.73 When the confederates act with confidence and enthusiasm, subjects also 
show heightened confidence in their judgments, even when they were simply following 
the crowd. Consider also the general claim that imitation of most other people can 
                                                 
67 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on 
Representative Government 73 (H.B. Acton ed. 1972). 
68 See id. at 72-76. 
69 See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 66 (1999). 
70 Id. 
71 See Robert Baron et al., The Forgotten Variable in Conformity Research: Impact of Task Importance on 
Social Influence, 71 J Personality and Social Psych. 915 (1996). 
72 Id. at 923. 
73 Id. 
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operate as a kind of fast and frugal heuristic, one that works well for many creatures, 
including human beings, in a wide variety of settings.74 Like most heuristics, the 
imitation heuristic, while generally sensible and often the best available, also produces 
errors in many situations.75 
 
There is a disturbing implication. A “majority consensus” is “often capable of 
misleading individuals into inaccurate, irrational, or unjustified judgments.” Such a 
consensus “can also produce heightened confidence in such judgments as well.” 76 It 
follows that “so long as the judgments are difficult or ambiguous, and the influencing 
agents are united and confident, increasing the importance of accuracy will heighten 
confidence as well as conformity—a dangerous combination.”77 The point very much 
bears on the sources of unjustified extremism, especially under circumstances in which 
countervailing information is unavailable.78 The same point helps explain group 
influences within the federal courts.79 
 
2. Asch’s original studies found that varying the size of the group of confederates, 
unanimously making the erroneous decision, mattered only up to a number of three; 
increases from that point had little effect.80 Using one confederate did not increase 
subjects’ errors at all; using two confederates increased errors to 13.6%; and using from 
three confederates increased error to 31.8%, not substantially different from the level that 
emerged from further increases in group size. But Asch’s own findings appear unusual on 
this count. Subsequent studies have found that, contrary to Asch’s own findings, 
increases in the size of the group of confederates usually do increase conformity.81  
 
More significantly, a modest variation in the experimental conditions made all the 
difference: the existence of at least one compatriot, or voice of sanity, dramatically 
reduced both conformity and error. When one confederate made a correct match, errors 
were reduced by three-quarters, even if there was a strong majority the other way.82 There 
is a clear implication here: If a group is embarking on an unfortunate course of action, a 
single dissenter might be able to turn it around, by energizing ambivalent group members 
who would otherwise follow the crowd. It follows that affective ties among members, 
making even a single dissent less likely, might well undermine the performance of groups 
and institutions. Consider here a study of the performance of investment clubs—small 
groups of people who pool their money to make joint decisions about stock market 
                                                 
74 See Daniel Goldstein et al., Why and When Do Simple Heuristics Work?, in Bounded Rationality, supra 
note, at 174. 
75 See id. 
76 Baron et al., supra note, at 925. 
77 Id. at 925. 
78 See Hardin, supra note. 
79 See below. 
80 Asch, supra note. 
81 Baron, supra note, at 119-20. 
82 Id. at 18. The finding here is reminiscent of the tale of The Emperor’s New Clothes, in which a single 
voice of sanity was necessary and sufficient to expose the truth. See Hans Christian Anderson, The 
Emperor’s New Suit, in Hans Christian Anderson, Shorter Tales (Jean Hersholt trans. 1948; originally 
published 1837). 
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investments.83 The worst-performing clubs were built on affective ties and primarily 
social; the best-performing clubs limited social connections and were focused on 
increasing returns. Dissent was far more frequent in the high-performing clubs. The low 
performers usually had unanimous votes, with little open debate. The problem is that the 
votes in low performing groups were “cast to build social cohesion rather than to make 
the best financial choice.”84 In short, conformity resulted in significantly lower returns. 
 
3. Much depends on the subject’s perceived relationship to the experimenters’ 
confederates and in particular on whether the subject considers himself part of the same 
group in which those confederates fall. If the subject identified himself as a member of a 
different group from the majority, the conformity effect is greatly reduced.85 People are 
especially likely to conform when the group consists of people whom subjects like or 
admire, or otherwise identify with.86 The general point explains why group membership 
is often emphasized by those who seek to increase or decrease the influence of a certain 
point of view. Perhaps an advocate can be discredited, without the relevant group, by 
showing that he is a “conservative” or a “liberal,” prone to offer unacceptable views. 
 
Thus conformity—and hence error—is dramatically increased, in public 
statements, when the subject perceives himself as part of a reasonably discrete group that 
includes the experimenter’s confederates (all, like himself, psychology majors, for 
example).87 By contrast, conformity is dramatically decreased, and hence error is also 
dramatically decreased, in public statements when the subject perceives himself as in a 
different group from the experimenter’s confederates (all but himself ancient history 
majors, for example).88 Notably, private opinions, expressed anonymously afterwards, 
were about the same whether or not the subject perceived himself as a member of the 
same group as others in the experiment. And people who thought that they were members 
of the same group as the experimenter’s confederates gave far more accurate answers, 
and far less conforming answers, when they were speaking privately.89 In the real world, 
                                                 
83 Brooke Harrington, Cohesion, Conflict and Group Demography (unpublished manuscript 2000), 
84 Id.  
85 Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think By Knowing Who You Are, 29 Brit J Soc Psych 97, 
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would-be dissenters might silence themselves partly when and because they trust group 
members to be right, partly because they do not want to risk the opprobrium of like-
minded others, and partly because they fear that they will, through their dissent, weaken 
the effectiveness and reputation of the group to which they belong. There is a large lesson 
here. Publicly expressed statements, showing agreement with a majority view, may be 
both wrong and insincere, especially when relevant speakers identify themselves as 
members of the same group as the majority.90 The finding of heightened conformity is 
linked with evidence of poor performance by groups whose members are connected by 
affective ties; in such groups, people are less likely to say what they know and more 
likely to suppress disagreement. A system of checks and balances, attempting to ensure 
that ambition will check ambition,91 can be understood as a way of increasing the 
likelihood of dissent, and of decreasing the likelihood that members of any particular 
group, or institution, will be reluctant to disclose what they think and know.92  
 
E. Shocks, Authority, and Expertise 
 
 In the Sherif and Asch experiments, no particular person has special expertise. No 
member of the group shows unusual measurement abilities or wonderful eyesight. But we 
might safely predict that subjects would be even more inclined to blunder if they had 
reason to believe that one or more of the experimenters’ confederates was particularly 
likely to be correct. This hypothesis receives support from a possible interpretation of one 
of the most alarming findings in modern social science, involving conformity not to the 
judgments of peers, but to the will of an experimenter.93 These experiments are of 
independent interest, because they have implications for social influences on judgments 
of morality, not merely facts. 
                                                                                                                                                 
rights, affect anonymous opinions more than publicly stated opinions. See id. at 80. This point has obvious 
implications for the effects of secret votes and ballots. 
90 Consider the fact that the least conformity, and the greatest accuracy, was found when people who 
thought of themselves in a different group were speaking publicly. At the same time, the largest number of 
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was not notably higher than in other conditions. See Abrams et al., supra note, at 108. 
91 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition."). 
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example, an opinion issue.” Bond and Smith, supra note, at 128. Since the 1950s, there has been a linear 
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out within heterogeneous organizations. See Caryn Christenson and Ann Abbott, Team Medical Decision 
Making, in Decision Making in Health Care (Gretchen Chapman and Frank Sonnenberg eds. 2000), at 267, 
273-76. This last point suggests the importance of creating mechanisms to ensure that low-status people 
speak and are heard. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble: Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 Yale 
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93 This unconventional interpretation is set out in Thomas Blass, The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: 
Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority, in Obedience to Authority: Critical 
Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm 35, 38-44 (Thomas Blass ed. 1999). Shiller, supra note, at 150-51. 
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 The experiments, conducted by the psychologist Stanley Milgram, ask people to 
administer electric shocks to a person sitting in an adjacent room.94 Subjects are told, 
falsely, that the purpose of the experiment is to test the effects of punishment on memory. 
Unbeknownst to the subject, the victim of the electric shocks is a confederate and there 
are no real shocks. The apparent shocks are delivered by a simulated shock generator, 
offering thirty clearly delineated voltage levels, ranging from 15 to 450 volts, 
accompanied by verbal descriptions ranging from “Slight Shock” to “Danger: Severe 
Shock.”95 As the experiment unfolds, the subject is asked to administer increasingly 
severe shocks for incorrect answers, to and past the “Danger: Severe Shock” level, which 
begins at 400 volts. 
 
 In Milgram’s original experiments, the subjects included forty men between the 
ages of 20 and 50. They came from a range of occupations, including engineers, high 
school teachers, and postal clerks.96 They were paid $4.50 for their participation—and 
also told that they could keep the money no matter how the experiment went. The 
“memory test” involved remembering word pairs; every mistake, by the 
confederate/victim, was to be met by an electric shock and a movement to one higher 
level on the shock generator. To ensure that everything seems authentic, the subject is, at 
the beginning of the experiment, given an actual sample shock at the lowest level. But the 
subject is also assured that the shocks are not dangerous, with the experimenter declaring, 
in response to a prearranged question from the confederate, “Although the shocks can be 
extremely painful, they cause no permanent tissue damage.”97  
 
In the original experiments, the victim does not make any protest until the 300-
volt shock, which produces a loud kick, by the victim, on the wall of the room where he 
is bound to the electric chair. After that point, the victim does not answer further 
questions, and is heard from only after the 315-volt shock, when he pounds on the wall 
again—and is not heard from thereafter, even with increases in shocks to and past the 
400-volt level. If the subject indicates an unwillingness to continue, the experimenter 
offers prods of increasing firmness, from “Please go on” to “You have no other choice; 
you must go on.”98 But the experimenter has no power to impose sanctions on subjects. 
 
 Most people predict that in such studies, over 95% of subjects would refuse to 
proceed to the end of the series of shocks. When people are asked to make predictions 
about what people would do, the expected breakoff point is “Very Strong Shock,”99 of 
195 volts. But in Milgram’s experiment, every one of the forty subjects went beyond 300 
volts. The mean maximum shock level was 405 volts; and a strong majority—26 of 40, or 
65%—went to the full 450-volt shock, two steps beyond “Danger: Severe Shock.” 100  
                                                 
94 See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, in Readings About the Social Animal 23 (7th ed. 
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95 Id. at 24.  
96 Id. at 25. 
97 Id. at 27. 
98 Id. at 29. 
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100 See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority 35 (1974). 
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Later variations on the original experiments produced even more remarkable 
results. In those experiments, the victim expresses a growing level of pain and distress as 
the voltage increases.101 Small grunts are heard from 75 volts to 105 volts, and at 120 
volts, the subject shouts, to the experimenter, that the shocks were starting to become 
painful. At 150 volts, the victims cries out, “Experimenter, get me out of here! I won’t be 
in the experiment any more! I refuse to go on!”102 At 180 volts, the victim says, “I can’t 
stand the pain.” At 270 volts he responds with an agonized scream. At 300 volts he 
shouts that he will no longer answer the questions. At 315 volts he screams violently. At 
330 volts and after, he is not heard. In this version of the experiment, there is no 
significant change in Milgram’s results: 25 of 40 participants went to the maximum level, 
and the mean maximum level was over 360 volts. In a somewhat gruesome variation, the 
victim says, before the experiment begins, that he has a heart condition, and his pleas to 
discontinue the experiment include repeated reference to the fact his heart is “bothering” 
him as the shocks continue.103 This too did not lead subjects to behave differently.104 
 
Milgram himself explains his results as showing obedience to authority, in a way 
reminiscent of the behavior Germans under Nazi rule; and indeed Milgram was partly 
motivated by the goal of understanding how the Holocaust could have happened.105 
Milgram concluded that ordinary people will follow orders even if the result is to produce 
great suffering in innocent others. Undoubtedly simple obedience is part of the picture. 
But there is another explanation.106 Subjects who are invited to an academic setting, to 
participate in an experiment run by an apparently experienced scientist, might well defer 
to the experimenters’ instructions in the belief that the experimenter is likely to know 
what should be done, all things considered. If the experimenter asks subjects to proceed, 
most subjects might believe, not unreasonably, that the harm apparently done to the 
victims is not serious and that the experiment actually has significant benefits for society. 
On this account, the experimenter has special expertise. If this is right, then the 
participants in the Milgram experiments might be seen as similar to those in the Asch 
experiments, with the experimenter having a greatly amplified voice. And on this 
account, many of the subjects might have put their moral qualms to one side, not because 
of blind obedience, but because of a judgment that those qualms are likely to have been 
ill-founded. That judgment might be based in turn on a belief that the experimenter is not 
likely to ask subjects to proceed if the experiment is truly objectionable.  
 
In short, Milgram’s subjects might be responding to an especially loud 
informational signal—the sort of signal sent by a specialist or a crowd. And on this view, 
Milgram was wrong to draw an analogy between the behavior of his subjects and the 
behavior of Germans under Hitler. His subjects were not simply obeying a leader, but 
responding to someone whose credentials and good faith they thought they could trust. Of 
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course it is not simple, in theory or in practice, to distinguish between obeying a leader 
and accepting the beliefs of an expert. The only suggestion is that the obedience of 
subjects was hardly baseless; it involved a setting in which subjects had some reason to 
think that the experimenter was not asking them to produce serious physical harm out of 
sadism or for no reason at all. 
 
A subsequent study, exploring the grounds of obedience, offers support for this 
claim.107 In that study, a large number of subjects watched the tapes of the Milgram 
experiments, and were asked to rank possible explanations for compliance with the 
experimenter’s request. Deference to expertise was the highest-rank option. This is not 
definitive, of course, but an illuminating variation on the basic experiment, by Milgram 
himself, provides further support.108 In this variation, the subject is among three people 
asked to administer the shocks, and two of those people, actually confederates, refuse to 
go past a certain level (150 volts for one and 210 volts for the other). In such cases, the 
overwhelming majority of subjects—92.5%—defy the experimenter.109 This was by far 
the most effective of Milgram’s many variations on his basic study, all designed to 
reduce the level of obedience.110  
 
Why was the defiance of peers so potent? I suggest that the subjects, in this 
variation, were very much like those subjects who had at least one supportive confederate 
in Asch’s experiments. One such confederate led Asch’s subjects to say what they saw; 
so too, peers who acted on the basis of conscience freed Milgram’s subject to follow their 
consciences as well. Milgram himself established, in yet another variation, that without 
any advice from the experimenter, and without any external influences at all, the 
subject’s moral judgment was clear: do not administer shocks above a very low level.111 
Indeed that moral judgment had nearly the same degree of clarity, to Milgram’s subjects, 
as the clear and correct factual judgments made by Asch’s subjects when they were 
deciding about the length of lines on their own (and hence not confronted with Asch’s 
confederates). In Mailgram’s experiments, it was the experimenter’s own position—that 
the shocks should continue and that no permanent damage would be done—that had a 
high degree of influence, akin to the influence of the Asch’s unanimous confederates. But 
when the subject’s peers rejected the position of Milgram’s experimenter, the 
informational content of that position was effectively negated by the information 
presented by the refusals of peers. Hence subjects could rely on their own moral 
judgments, or even follow the moral signals indicated by the peers’ refusals.  
 
The general lessons are not obscure. When the morality of a situation is not clear, 
people might well be influenced by someone who seems to be a expert, able to weigh the 
risks involved. But when the expert’s questionable moral judgment is countered by 
reasonable people, who bring their own moral judgments to bear, most people are 
unlikely to follow experts. They are far more likely to do as their conscience dictates. As 
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we shall see, compliance with law has similar features. A legal pronouncement about 
what should be done will often operate in the same way as an expert judgment about what 
should be done. It follows that people will follow the law even when it is hardly ever 
enforced—and even if they would otherwise be inclined to question the judgment that the 
law embodies. But if peers are willing to violate the law, violations may become 
widespread, especially but not only if people think that the law is enjoining them from 
doing something that they wish to do, either for selfish reasons or for reasons of 
principle. In this way, Milgram’s experiments offer some lessons about when law will be 
ineffective unless vigorously enforced—and also about the preconditions for civil 
disobedience. 
 
III. Cascades 
 
I now examine how informational and reputational influences can produce social 
cascades—large-scale social movements in which many people end up thinking 
something, or doing something, because of the beliefs or actions of a few early movers. 
As in the case of conformity, participation in cascades is fueled by social influences. But 
where the idea of conformity helps to explain social stability, an understanding of 
cascades helps to explain social and legal movements, which can be stunningly rapid, and 
which can also produce situations that are highly unstable.  
 
Cascades can involve judgments about facts or values. They operate within 
legislatures and the judicial system as well as within groups of citizens. And when people 
have affective connections with one another, the likelihood of cascades increases. In the 
area of social risks, cascades are especially common, with people coming to fear certain 
products and processes not because of private knowledge, but because of the apparent 
fears of others.112 The system of legal precedent also produces cascades, as early 
decisions lead later courts to a certain result, and eventually most or all courts come into 
line, not because of independent judgments, but because of a decision to follow the 
apparently informed decisions of others.113 The sheer level of agreement will be 
misleading if most courts have been influenced, even decisively influenced, by their 
predecessors, especially in highly technical areas. 
 
By themselves cascades are neither good nor bad. It is possible that the underlying 
processes will lead people to sound decisions about risks, morality, or law. The problem, 
a serious one, is that people may well converge, through the same processes, on 
erroneous or insufficiently justified outcomes. But to say this is to get ahead of the story; 
let us begin with the mechanics. 
 
A. Informational Cascades: The Basic Phenomenon 
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In an informational cascade, people cease relying, at a certain point, on their 
private information or opinions. They decide instead on the basis of the signals conveyed 
by others. Once this happens, the subsequent actions, made by few or many others, add 
no new information. It follows that the behavior of the first few actors can, in theory, 
produce similar behavior from countless followers. A particular problem arises if people 
think that the large number of people who say or do something are acting on independent 
knowledge; this can make it very hard to stop the cascade. 
 
1. A simple illustration. Begin with a stylized example, and suppose that doctors 
are deciding whether to prescribe hormone therapy for menopausal women. If hormone 
therapy creates significant risks of heart disease, its net value, let us assume, is –1; if it 
does not create such risks, its net value is +1.114 Let us also assume that the doctors are in 
a temporal queue, and each doctor knows his place on that queue. From his own 
experience, each doctor has some private information about what should be done. But 
each doctor also cares, rationally, about the judgments of others. Anderson is the first to 
decide, and prescribes hormone therapy if his judgment is low risk but declines if his 
judgment is high risk. Suppose that Anderson prescribes. Barber now knows that 
Anderson’s judgment was low risk and that she too should certainly urge hormone 
therapy if she makes that independent judgment. But if her independent judgment is that 
the risk is high, she would—if she trusts Anderson no more and no less than she trusts 
herself—be indifferent about whether to prescribe, and might simply flip a coin.  
 
Now turn to a third doctor, Carlton. Suppose that both Anderson and Barber have 
prescribed hormone therapy, but that Carlton’s own information suggests that the risk is 
high. In that event, Carlton might well ignore what he knows and prescribe the therapy. It 
is likely, in these circumstances, that both Anderson and Barber saw a low risk, and 
unless Carlton thinks that his own information is better than theirs, he should follow their 
lead. If he does, Carlton is in a cascade. To the extent that Carlton is not acting on the 
basis of his own information, and to the extent that subsequent doctors know what others 
have done and why, they will do exactly what Carlton did: prescribe hormone therapy 
regardless of their private information. “Since opposing information remains hidden, 
even a mistaken cascade lasts forever. An early preponderance toward either adoption or 
rejection, which may have occurred by mere coincidence or for trivial reasons, can feed 
upon itself . . .”115  
 
Notice that the serious problem here lies in the fact that for those in a cascade, 
actions do not disclose privately held information. In the example just given, doctors’ 
actions will not reflect the overall knowledge, or the aggregate knowledge, of the health 
consequences of hormone therapy—even if the information held by individual doctors, if 
actually revealed and aggregated, would give a quite accurate picture of the situation. The 
reason for the problem is that individual doctors are following the lead of those who 
came before. As noted, this problem is aggravated if subsequent doctors overestimate the 
extent to which their predecessors relied on private information and did not merely 
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follow those who came before. If this is so, subsequent doctors might fail to rely on, and 
fail to reveal, private information that actually exceeds the information collectively held 
by those who started the cascade. The problem here is that the medical profession 
generally will lack information that it needs to have. Participants in cascades act 
rationally in suppressing their private information, whose disclosure would benefit the 
group more than the individual who has it.116 The failure to disclose private information 
therefore presents a free-rider problem. To overcome that problem, some kind of 
institutional reform seems to be necessary. 
 
Of course cascades do not always develop, and of course they usually do not last 
forever. Often people have, or think that they have, enough private information to reject 
the accumulated wisdom of others. Medical specialists sometimes fall in this category. 
When cascades develop, they might be broken by corrective information, as has 
apparently happened in the case of hormone replacement therapy itself.117 In the domain 
of science, peer-reviewed work provides a valuable safeguard. But even among 
specialists and indeed doctors, cascades are common. “Most doctors are not at the cutting 
edge of research; their inevitable reliance upon what colleagues have done and are doing 
leads to numerous surgical fads and treatment-caused illnesses.”118 Thus an article in the 
prestigious New England Journal of Medicine explores “bandwagon diseases” in which 
doctors act like “lemmings, episodically and with a blind infectious enthusiasm pushing 
certain diseases and treatments primarily because everyone else is doing the same.”119 
Some medical practices, including tonsillectomy, “seem to have been adopted initially 
based on weak information,” and extreme differences in tonsillectomy frequencies (and 
other procedures) provide good evidence that cascades are at work.120 And once several 
doctors join the cascade, it is liable to spread. There is a link here with Sherif’s 
experiments, showing the development of divergent but entrenched norms, based on 
group processes in areas in which individuals lack authoritative information. In fact, 
prescriptions of hormone replacement therapy were fueled by cascade-like processes.121  
 
What is true for doctors is highly likely to be true for lawyers, engineers, 
legislators, bureaucrats, judges, investors,122 and academics123 as well. It is easy to see 
how cascades might develop among groups of citizens, especially but not only if those 
groups are small, insulated, and connected by affective ties. If Barry does not know 
whether global warming is a serious problem, and if Alberta insists that it is, Barry might 
well be persuaded, and their friend Charles is likely to go along, making it unlikely that 
Danielle will be willing to reject the shared judgment of the developing group. When 
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small communities of like-minded people end up fearing a certain risk, or fearing and 
hating another group, cascades are often responsible.  
 
2. Precedential cascades. Consider a legal analogue124: There is a disputed issue 
under the Endangered Species Act. The first court of appeals to decide the question finds 
the issue genuinely difficult, but resolves the issue favorably to the government. The 
second court of appeals favors, very slightly, the view that the government is wrong, but 
the holding of another circuit is enough to tip the scales in the government’s favor. A 
third court of appeals is also slightly predisposed to rule against the government, but it 
lacks the confidence to reject the shared view of two circuits. Eventually all circuits come 
into line, with the final few feeling the great weight of the unanimous position of others, 
and perhaps insufficiently appreciating the extent to which that weight is a product of an 
early and somewhat idiosyncratic judgment. Because the courts of appeals are in 
agreement, the Supreme Court denies certiorari. 
 
To be sure, precedential cascades do not always happen, and splits among courts 
of appeals are common.125 One reason is that subsequent courts often have sufficient 
confidence to conclude that predecessor courts have erred. But it is inevitable that 
cascades will sometimes develop, especially in highly technical areas, and it will be hard 
to detect them after they have occurred. The prescriptive implication is clear: Judicial 
panels should be cautious about giving a great deal of weight to the shared view of two or 
more courts of appeals. A patient who seeks a second opinion does well not to disclose 
the first opinion to his new doctor, so as to ensure independence; so too, a court of 
appeals should be alert to the possibility that the unanimity of previous courts does not 
reflect independent agreement. And when the Supreme Court rejects the unanimous view 
of a large number of courts of appeals, a precedential cascade might well have been 
responsible for the unanimity.126 For the legal system, the danger is that a cascade, 
producing agreement among the lower courts, might prove self-insulating as well as self-
reinforcing. Unless there is clear error, why should the Supreme Court become involved? 
 
3. Rationality and error. In informational cascades as discussed thus far, each 
participant is being entirely rational; they are acting as they should in the face of limited 
information. But as I have suggested, it is possible that participants in the cascade will 
fail to see the extent to which the decisions of their predecessors carry little independent 
information. If most scientists think that global warming is a serious problem, can they 
really be wrong? A possible answer is that they might indeed be wrong, especially if they 
are not relying on their private information and are following the signals sent by other 
people. And people often seem to mistake a cascade for a series of separate and 
independent judgments. In 2001, for example, hundreds of law professors signed a 
statement condemning, on constitutional grounds, President Bush’s decision to permit 
military tribunals to try suspected terrorists.127 The sheer number of signatures seems 
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extremely impressive. But it is perhaps less so if we consider the likelihood that most 
signatories lacked reliable information on the esoteric legal issue in question, and were 
simply following the apparently reliable but actually uninformative judgment of 
numerous others.  
 
Despite the rationality of those who participate in informational cascades, there is 
a serious risk of error. People might easily converge on an erroneous, damaging, or 
dangerous path, simply because they are failing to disclose and to act on the basis of all 
the information that they have.128 
 
4. Laboratory evidence. Cascades are easy to create in laboratory settings. Some 
of the experiments are detailed and a bit technical, but four general lessons are clear. 
First, people will often neglect their own private information and defer to the information 
provided by their predecessors. Second, people are alert to whether their predecessors are 
especially informed; more informed people can shatter a cascade. Third, and perhaps 
most intriguingly, cascade effects are greatly reduced if people are rewarded not for 
correct individual decisions, but for correct decisions by a majority of the group to which 
they belong. Fourth, cascade effects, and blunders, are significantly increased if people 
are rewarded not for correct decisions, but for decisions that conform to the decisions 
made by most people. As we shall see, these general lessons have implications for 
institutional design. They suggest that errors are most likely when people are rewarded 
for conforming, and least likely when people are rewarding for helping groups and 
institutions to decide correctly. 
 
The simplest experiment asked subjects to guess whether the experiment was 
using Urn A, which contained two red balls and one white, or Urn B, which contained 
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two white balls and one red.129 In each period, the contents of the chosen urn were 
emptied in a container. A randomly selected subject was asked to make one (and only 
one) private draw of a ball. After that draw, the subject recorded, on an answer sheet, the 
color of the draw and his own decision about the urn. The subject’s draw is not 
announced to the group, but the subject’s decision about the urn is disclosed. Then the 
urn is passed to the next subject for his own private draw, which is not disclosed, and his 
own decision about the urn, which is disclosed. This process continued until all subjects 
had made decisions, and at that time the experimenter announced the actual urn used. 
Subjects could earn $2 for a correct decision.  
 
In this experiment, cascades often developed. After a number of individual 
judgments were revealed, people sometimes announced decisions that were inconsistent 
with their private draw, but that fit with the majority of previous announcements.130 Over 
77% of “rounds” resulted in cascades, and 15% of private announcements did not reveal 
a “private signal,” that is, the information provided by people’s own draw. Consider cases 
in which one person’s draw (say, red) contradicted the announcement of his predecessor 
(say, Urn B). In such cases, the second announcement nonetheless matched the first about 
11% of the time—far less than a majority, but enough to ensure occasional cascades. And 
when one person’s draw contradicted the announcement of two or more predecessors, the 
second announcement was likely to follow those who went before. Notably, the majority 
of decisions followed Bayes’ rule, and hence were rationally based on available 
information131—but erroneous cascades were nonetheless found. Here is an actual 
example of a cascade producing an entertainingly inaccurate outcome (the urn used was 
B)132: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private draw a a b b b b 
Decision A A A A A A 
 
What is noteworthy here, of course, is that the total amount of private 
information—four whites and two reds—justified the correct judgment, in favor of Urn 
B. But the existence of two early signals, producing rational but incorrect judgments, led 
all others to fall in line. “[I]nitial misrepresentative signals start a chain of incorrect 
decisions that is not broken by more representative signals received later.”133 It should be 
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simple to see how this result might map onto real-world assessments of factual, moral, 
and legal issues, especially in insulated groups, where external correction is less likely.  
 
B. How To Make and Break Cascades 
 
Is the likelihood of cascades affected by institutional arrangements and social 
norms? Can legal arrangements diminish or increase the risk of erroneous cascades, 
inadvertently or through conscious decision134? A central point here is that in an 
informational cascade, everyone is equal; people are simply trying to get the right 
answer; and people pay attention to the views and acts of others only because they want 
to be right. But it is easy to imagine slight alterations of the situation, so that some 
participants know more than others, or so that people do not only care whether they are 
right. How would these alterations affect outcomes?  
 
1. Fashion leaders and informed cascade-breakers. In the real world of cascades, 
“fashion leaders” have unusual importance.135 A prominent scientist might declare that 
global warming is a serious problem; a well-respected political leader might urge that war 
should be made against Iraq; a lawyer with particular credibility might conclude that 
recent antiterrorist legislation violates the Constitution. In any of these cases, the speaker 
provides an especially loud informational signal, perhaps sufficient to start or to stop a 
cascade.  
 
Now turn to the actions of followers. In the hormone therapy case, no doctor is 
assumed to have, or to believe that she has, more information than her predecessors. But 
in many cases, people know, or think that they know, a great deal. It is obvious that such 
people are far less likely to follow those who came before. Whether they will do so 
should depend on a comparison between the amount of information provided by the 
behavior of predecessors and the amount of private information that they have. And in 
principle, more informed people will shatter cascades, possibly initiating new and better 
ones. Whether this will happen, in practice, depends on whether the people who come 
later know, or believe, that the deviant agent was actually well-informed. If so, the more 
informed people operate as fashion leaders.  
 
A simple study attempts to test the question whether more informed people 
actually shatter cascades.136 The study was essentially the same as the urn experiment just 
described, except that players had a special option after any sequence of two identical 
decisions (for example, two “Urn A” decisions): They could make not one but two 
independent draws before deciding. The other subjects were informed of every case in 
which a player was making two draws. The simplest finding is that this “shattering 
mechanism” did indeed reduce the number of cascades—and thus significantly improved 
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decisions.137 But the mechanism did not work perfectly. In some cases, cascades were 
nonetheless found. And in some cases, people who were permitted to draw twice, and 
saw two different balls (say, one red and one white), concluded, irrationally, that the 
cascade should be broken. The remarkable and somewhat disturbing outcome is that they 
initiated an inaccurate cascade. Consider this evidence, in a case in which the actual urn 
was A: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private draw a a b, a b a b 
decision A A B B B B 
 
This disturbing pattern undoubtedly has real-world analogues, in which people 
sometimes give excessive weight to their own information, even if that information is 
ambiguous and in which it makes sense to follow the crowd. But the larger point is the 
simple one: More informed people are less influenced by the signals of others, and they 
also carry more influence themselves.  
 
But what about cases in which fashion leaders are not necessarily more informed, 
or in which they are seen by others as having more information, or more wisdom, than 
they actually have? We can imagine self-styled experts—on diets, or herbal foods, or 
alternative medicine, or economic trends—who successfully initiate cascades. The risk 
here is that the views of fashion leaders will be wrongly taken as authoritative. The result 
can be to lead people to errors and even to illness and death. How can society protect 
itself? He answers lie in good institutional arrangements, civil liberties, free markets, and 
good social norms, encouraging people to be skeptical of supposed experts. In systems 
with freedom of speech and free markets, it is always possible to debunk supposedly 
authoritative sources. And within groups, it is possible to structure decisionmaking so as 
to reduce the relevant risks. Votes might, for example, be taken in reverse order of 
seniority, so as to ensure that less experienced people will not be unduly influenced by 
the judgments of their predecessors; this is in fact the practice on the United States 
Supreme Court. 
 
2. Majority rule: rewarding correct outcomes by groups rather than by individuals. 
How would the development of cascades be affected by an institution that rewards 
correct answers not by individuals, but by the majority of the group? In an intriguing 
variation on the urn experiment, subjects were paid $2 for a correct group decision, and 
penalized $2 for an incorrect group decision, with the group decision determined by 
majority rule.138 People were neither rewarded nor punished for a correct individual 
decision. The result was that only 39% of rounds saw cascades. In 92% of cases, people’s 
announcement matched their private draw.139 And because people revealed their private 
signals, the system of majority rule produced a substantial increase in fully informed 
decisions—that is, the outcomes that someone would reach if he were somehow able to 
see all private information in the system. A simple way to understand this point is to 
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assume that a group has a large number of members and that each member makes an 
announcement that matches his private draw. As a statistical matter, it is overwhelmingly 
likely that the majority’s position will be correct. As an example, consider this period 
from the majority rule experiment140 (the actual urn was A): 
 
          
Private draw a a a a b a a a b 
Decision A A A A B A A A B 
 
What is the explanation for this significantly reduced level of cascade behavior in 
a system of majority rule? The answer lies in the fact that the individual knows that he 
has nothing to gain from a correct individual decision and everything to gain from a 
correct group decision. As a result, it is in the individual’s interest to say exactly what he 
sees, because it is the accurate announcement, from each person, that is most likely to 
promote an accurate group decision.141  
 
Note that to explain the effect of majority rule in producing better outcomes, it is 
not necessary or even helpful to say that when the group decision counts, people are 
altruistic or less concerned with their self-interest. On the contrary, self-interest provides 
a fully adequate explanation of the people’s behavior. In the individual condition, it is 
sensible to care little about the accuracy of one’s signal to others; that is an informational 
externality142—affecting others, for better or for worse, but not affecting one’s own 
likelihood of gain. If a subject’s individual signal misleads others, the subject has no 
reason to care. But under the majority rule condition that I have just described, the 
subject should care a great deal about producing an accurate signal, simply because an 
inaccurate signal will reduce the likelihood that the group will get it right. And here the 
subject need not care about the accuracy of his individual decision except insofar as that 
decision provides a helpful signal to the group. Hence it is only to be expected that 
cascades are reduced, and correct outcomes are increased, when people are rewarded for 
good group decisions.  
 
There is a general point here. It is individually rational, under plausible 
assumptions, to participate in a cascade; participants benefit themselves at the same time 
that they fail to benefit others (by failing to disclose privately held information) or 
affirmatively harm others (by giving them the wrong signal). This claim holds even if 
conformity is not rewarded as such. By contrast, it is not rational, under plausible 
assumptions, to disclose or act upon private information, even though the disclosure or 
action will actually benefit others. The upshot is that dissenters, disclosing their own 
private information, need to be encouraged, simply because they confer benefits on those 
who observe them. If the point is put together with an emphasis on the risk of cascades on 
courts, there is fresh reason to appreciate judicial dissents, if only because they increase 
the likelihood that majority decisions will receive critical scrutiny. Note here that within 
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the Supreme Court alone, dissenting opinions have frequently become the law, indeed 
have become the law on well over 130 occasions143—a point to which I will return. 
 
The upshot is that dissenters and nonconformists, disclosing their own private 
information, should be encouraged, simply because they confer benefits on those who 
observe them. Now let us put this point together with a recognition of the risk of cascades 
on courts. We can readily see a new reason to appreciate judicial dissents, if only because 
they increase the likelihood that majority decisions will receive critical scrutiny. Note 
here that within the Supreme Court alone, dissenting opinions have frequently become 
the law, indeed have become the law on well over 130 occasions144—a point to which I 
will return. 
 
This claim has an implication for appropriate institutional arrangements: Any 
system that creates incentives for individuals to reveal information to the group is likely 
to produce better outcomes. A system of majority rule, in which individuals known that 
their well-being will be promoted (or not) depending on the group’s decision, therefore 
has significant advantages. Well-functioning organizations, public as well as private, are 
likely to benefit from this insight. In this light, we might even offer a suggestion about 
the nature of civic responsibility: In case of doubt, citizens should reveal their private 
signal, rather than disguising that signal and agreeing with the crowd. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, this kind of behavior is not optimal from the point of view of the 
individual who seeks to get things right, but it is best from the point of view of a group or 
nation that seeks to use all relevant information.  
 
3. Disclosers, dissenters, and contrarians. It is important to make some 
distinctions here. The majority-rewarding variation on the urn experiment gives people an 
incentive to disclose accurate, privately-held information. This is the information from 
which the group benefits, and this is the information that does not emerge if people are 
rewarded for correct individual decisions. Full disclosure of accurate information is a 
central goal of institutional design.145 But the experiment does not suggest that a group is 
better off if people always disagree, or even if they always say what they think. In the tale 
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of the Emperor’s New Clothes, the boy is not a skeptic or a malcontent. On the contrary, 
he is a particular kind of dissenter; he is a discloser, revealing the information that he 
actually holds. The majority-rewarding variation of the urn experiment encourages 
subjects to act like that boy.  
 
By contrast, we can imagine a different kind of person, a contrarian, who feels 
that he will be rewarded, financially or otherwise, simply for disagreeing with others. 
There is no reason to celebrate the contrarian. In many cases, contrarians are most 
unlikely to give any help to the group. If the contrarian is known as such, his signal will 
be very noisy and not very informative. If the contrarian is not known as such, he is still 
failing to disclose accurate information, and in that sense he is not helping the group to 
arrive at correct decisions. We could imagine a variation on the urn experiment in which 
a contrarian-confederate regularly announced the opposite of what his predecessor 
announced. It is safe to predict that such behavior would reduce cascades, but it would 
not reduce errors by individuals or groups. On the contrary, it would increase them. 
 
Dissenters who are disclosers, then, are to be prized. This is certainly if they are 
disclosing the full truth about the issue at hand, and also if they are revealing accurate 
information, bearing on that issue, that they actually hold. By contrast, dissenters who are 
contrarians are at best a mixed blessing. And we can also imagine dissenters who do not 
disclose a missing fact, but instead simply state a point of view that would otherwise be 
missing from group discussion. Such dissenters might urge, for example, that animals 
should have rights, or that school prayer should be permitted, or that the law should allow 
homosexual marriage, or that capital punishment should be banned. In the domains of 
politics and law, cascade-type behavior typically leads people to be silent not about facts, 
but about points of view. It is obvious that a group needs relevant facts; does it need to 
know about privately held opinions as well?  
 
There are two reasons that it does. First, those opinions are of independent 
interest. If most or many people favor school prayer, or believe that capital punishment is 
morally unacceptable, it is valuable to know that fact. Other things being equal, both 
individuals and governments do better if they know what their fellow citizens really 
think. Second, people with dissenting opinions might well have good arguments. It is 
important for those who conform, or fall into a cascade, or independently concur to hear 
those arguments. This is a standard Millian point,146 to which I will shortly return. Judge 
Richard Posner suggests that judges often offer a “go along concurrence,”147 joining the 
majority though they privately disagree. Such judges give a false signal about their actual 
opinions and, very possibly, their future votes.  
 
4. Conformity and reputation. Suppose that people are rewarded not only or not 
mostly for being correct, but also or mostly for doing what other people do. The reward 
might be material, in the form of more cash or improved prospects, or it might be non-
material, in the form of more and better relationships. In the real world, people are often 
punished for nonconformity and rewarded for conformity. Someone who rejects the 
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views of leaders or of the majority, might well find himself less likely to be promoted and 
more likely to be disliked. Organizations, groups, and governments often prize harmony, 
and nonconformists tend to introduce disharmony. Sometimes it is more important to be 
“on the team” than to be right. “Sometimes cultural groups adopt very high levels of 
norm enforcement that severely suppress the individual variations, innovations, and 
‘errors’ that innate cultural transmission mechanisms require to generate adaptive 
evolutionary processes within groups.”148 
 
The likely result should be clear. If rewards come to those who conform, cascade-
like behavior will increase, simply because the incentive to be correct is strengthened or 
replaced by the incentive to do what others do. The extent of this effect will depend on 
the extent of the incentive to conform. But whenever the incentive is positive, people will 
be all the more likely to ignore their private information and to follow others. The 
opposite result should be expected if people are penalized for following others or 
rewarded for independence; if so, cascade-like behavior should be reduced or even 
eliminated. I am now emphasizing the incentive to conform, but in some settings 
independence is prized, and I will offer a few remarks on that possibility below. 
 
If conformity is rewarded, the problem is especially severe for the earliest 
disclosers or dissenters, who “may bear especially high costs because they are 
conspicuous, individually identified, and easy to isolate for reprisals.”149 And if the 
earliest dissenters are successfully deterred, dissent is likely to be exceedingly rare. But 
once the number of disclosers or dissenters reaches a certain level, there may be a tipping 
point, producing a massive change in behavior.150 Indeed a single discloser, or a single 
skeptic, might be able to initiate a chain of events by which a myth is shattered. Return to 
the tale of the Emperor’s New Clothes: “A child, however, who had no important job and 
could only see things as his eyes showed them to him, went up to the carriage. ‘The 
Emperor is naked,’ he said. . . . [T]he boy's remark, which had been heard by the 
bystanders, was repeated over and over again until everyone cried: ‘The boy is right! The 
Emperor is naked! It's true!’”151 But it might be very difficult to initiate this process, 
especially if early disclosers are subject to social or legal sanctions. Here we can see a 
potentially beneficial role of misfits and malcontents, who should perform a valuable 
function in getting otherwise neglected material and perspectives to others. Consider the 
suggestion that extremely harmful cultural effects result from a “social structure” that 
eliminates “valuable innovators, experimenters, and error-makers from being viewed as 
people to copy.”152 The qualification, noted above, is that regular contrarians might 
reduce cascades without reducing errors.153 
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a. An experiment. With respect to conformity, these speculations are supported by 
an ingenious variation on the urn experiment mentioned above.154 In this experiment, 
people were paid twenty-five cents for a correct decision, but seventy-five cents for a 
decision that matched the decision of the majority of the group. There were punishments 
for incorrect and nonconforming answers as well. If people made an incorrect decision, 
they lost twenty-five cents; if their decision failed to match the group’s decision, they lost 
seventy-five cents.  
 
In this experiment, cascades appeared almost all of the time. No fewer than 96.7% 
of rounds resulted in cascades,155 and 35.3% of announcements did not match the 
announcer’s private signal, that is, the signal given by his own draw.156 And when the 
draw of a subsequent person contradicted the announcement of the predecessor, 72.2% of 
people matched the first announcement. Consider, as a dramatic illustration, this period 
of the experiment157 (the actual urn for this period was B): 
 
Conformity Experiment 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Private draw a b b b a b b b a b 
Decision A A A A A A A A A A 
 
b. Affective ties and stifled dissent. The lesson is that institutions that reward 
conformity, and punish deviance, are far more likely to produce worse decisions and to 
reveal less in the way of private information. And here there is a link to the earlier 
suggestion that serious mistakes are committed by groups whose members are connected 
by bonds of affection, friendship, and solidarity.158 In such groups, members are usually 
less willing, or even unwilling, to state objections and counterarguments, for fear that 
these will violate generally held norms. Cascades and bad decisions are likely; return to 
the investment clubs discussed above.159 We can see here that an organization that 
depends on affective ties is likely to stifle dissent and to minimize the disclosure of 
private information and belief; some religious and political organizations are obvious 
illustrations. A socially destructive norm of conformity aggravates people’s tendency to 
ignore their private information and to say and do what others do.  
 
If an organization wants to avoid error, it should make clear that it welcomes the 
disclosure private signals, simply because that is in the organization’s own general 
interest. This point might seem counterintuitive, because in most well-functioning 
societies, conformity to the majority’s view seems to be the civil thing to do. What I am 
suggesting here is that from the social standpoint, it is better to behave in the way that 
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one would if being right were all that mattered, and better still to behave as one would if 
a correct group decision were all that mattered. 
 
Of course the normative issues are not simple. Bonds of affection and solidarity 
are often important to group members, and many people do not appreciate dissent and 
disagreement. Perhaps the real point of the relevant group or organization is not to 
perform well, but to foster good relationships. Conformists avoid creating the difficulties 
that come from contestation, but at the expense, often, of a good outcome; dissenters tend 
to increase contestation while also improving performance.160 In the abstract, it is hard to 
specify the optimal tradeoffs between the various goods. If the central goal of group 
members is to maintain and improve social bonds and not to carry out some task, 
conformity might be encouraged, at least if nonconformists introduce tension and 
hostility. Or consider the question of dissent in wartime. It is important for those who 
wage war to know what citizens really think and also to have a sense of actual and 
potential errors. But it is also important, especially in wartime, for citizens to have a 
degree of solidarity and to believe that they are involved in a common endeavor; this 
belief can help solve collective action problems that otherwise threaten success. Some 
forms of dissent might correct mistakes while also undermining social bonds. Of course 
freedom of speech should be the rule, but there is no simple solution to this dilemma. We 
might simply notice that those who are inclined to dissent must decide whether it is 
worthwhile to create the disruption that comes from expressing their views.161 
 
c. When silence is golden. I have been stressing cases in which disclosure is in the 
group’s interest, but the immediately preceding discussion suggests the opposite 
possibility.162 If group members reveal information that is embarrassing or worse, they 
might assist a competitor or an adversary. They might also make it harder for the group to 
have candid discussions in the future, simply because everyone knows that whatever is 
said might be made public. Strong norms against “leaking” are a natural corrective. And 
if some members of the group have engaged in wrongdoing, revelation of that fact might 
injure many or all group members. Anyone who has ever attended a faculty meeting is 
aware of the possibility that speakers receive the full benefits of the time they use, while 
inflicting costs on others; this unfortunate state of affairs can lead to unduly long 
meetings. The same problem can inflict the deliberations of both legislatures and courts. 
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Conformity to a group norm, involving silence or informal time constraints, can be 
extremely valuable.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that the problem I am emphasizing—the failure to 
disclose accurate information that will benefit the public—is closely paralleled by the 
problems raised in many cases in which silence, not revelation, is a collective good.163 
And if disclosure will spread inaccurate information, it is unlikely to be beneficial,164 
especially if it negates the beneficial effects of previous decisions or produces a cascade 
of its own. Because my focus is on the failure to disclose information, I will not devote 
attention to situations in which silence is golden, except to note that the basic analysis of 
those situations is not so different from the analysis here.165 
 
d. Variations and the real world. The conformity experiment could itself be varied 
in many ways, with predictable results. If financial rewards were solely or almost solely 
for conformity, cascade behavior would be increased; if the seventy-five cent reward 
were cut in half, cascade behavior should decline. Of course it is possible to imagine 
many mixed systems. An obvious example is a system of majority rule in which people 
are also rewarded for conformity or punished for nonconformity. Will cascades develop 
in such cases? The answer will depend on the size of the various incentives. If the 
accuracy of the group’s decision will greatly affect individual well-being—if their lives 
depend on good results—cascades are less likely. But if the ultimate outcome has little 
effect, and if conformity will carry high rewards, cascades are inevitable. A system in 
which individuals receive $2 for a correct majority decision, and $.25 for conforming, 
will produce different (and better) results from a system in which individuals receive $.25 
for a correct majority decision, and $2 for conformity.  
 
The real world of groups and democracy offers countless variations on these 
rewards, and often the rewards are highly indeterminate; people do not know what they 
are or have a hard time in quantifying them. But there can be little doubt that conformity 
pressures actually result in less disclosure of information. Consider the suggestion of a 
medical researcher who questions a number of Lyme disease diagnoses: “Doctors can’t 
say what they think anymore. . . . If you quote me as saying these things, I’m as good as 
dead.”166 When privately interviewed, gang members express considerable discomfort 
about their antisocial behavior, but their own conduct suggests a full commitment, 
leading to a widespread belief that most people approve of what is being done.167 Or 
consider the remarks of a sociologist who has publicly raised questions about the health 
threats posed by mad-cow disease, suggesting that if you raise those doubts publicly, 
“You get made to feel like a pedophile.”168 Tocqueville explained the decline of the 
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French church, in the mid-eighteenth century, in these terms: “Those who retained their 
beliefs in the doctrines of the Church . . . dreading isolation more than error, professed to 
share the sentiments of the majority. So what was in reality the opinion of only a part . . . 
of the nation came to be regarded as the will of all and for this reason seemed irresistible, 
even to those who had given it this false appearance.”169 Or consider, as a chilling 
example, the suggestion from a killer of Mostar, during the Bosniar war, that his actions 
were not a product of his convictions about the evil character of those he was killing. On 
the contrary, many of them were his former friends. His explanation was that he had to do 
what he did to remain a part of his Serbian community.170  
 
There is a final wrinkle. In the settings discussed thus far, dissenters proceed at 
their peril and nonconformity is punished. This will be my emphasis throughout. But in 
some contexts, dissenters might be attempting to improve their own prospects, and 
dissenting might be a sensible way of doing that. A political dissenter, challenging some 
widespread practice, sometimes becomes more prominent and more successful as a 
result. A judge who dissents in a high-profile case might not greatly fear that her 
reputation will be harmed; on the contrary, she might think that the dissent will redound 
to her benefit. The point is strengthened once we consider the fact that a society consists 
of countless communities with a wide range of values and beliefs. A public dissenter 
might impair his reputation in one group but simultaneously strengthen it in another. Of 
course, some people say and do exactly what they think and do not greatly care about 
their reputations; for them, informational influences are far more important. The only 
suggestions are that much of the time, people do not want to lose the good opinion of 
relevant others, and that the result of this desire is to reduce the information that the 
public is able to have. 
 
e. Beyond information. Often people lack much information, strictly speaking, but 
they do have preferences and values. They might believe that the words “under God” 
should not be included in the pledge of allegiance. They might want to discontinue 
affirmative action. But in either case they might not reveal what they want, simply 
because of the pressure to conform. I have suggested that from the standpoint of 
democratic practice, this is a problem as well. Most of the time, it is valuable for people 
to disclose what they want and what they value. The basic findings as in the urn 
experiments would undoubtedly be the same for preferences and values as well as facts, 
with rewards for conformity greatly increasing the apparent (not real) degree of 
agreement.  
 
This point helps explain why “[u]npopular or dysfunctional norms may survive 
even in the presence of a huge, silent majority of dissenters.”171 Fearing the wrath of 
others, people might not publicly contest practices and values that they privately abhor. 
The practice of sexual harassment long predated the idea of sexual harassment, and the 
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innumerable women who were subject to harassment did not like it.172 But much of the 
time they were silent, largely because they feared the consequences of public complaint. 
It is interesting to speculate about the possibility that many current practices fall in the 
same general category: those that produce harm, and are known to produce harm, but that 
persist because most of those who are harmed believe that they will suffer if they object 
in public. 
 
C. Reputational Cascades 
 
If conformity pressures are taken seriously, we can see the possibility of 
reputational cascades, parallel to their informational sibling.173 In a reputational cascade, 
people think that they know what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they 
nonetheless go along with the crowd. Even the most confident people sometimes fall prey 
to this process, silencing themselves in the process. In fact the conformity-rewarding 
version of the urn experiment is an elegant example of a reputational cascade. It is thus 
possible to exploit the influence of peer pressure, found in the conformity experiments, to 
show how many social movements become possible.  
 
1. Mechanics. Suppose that Albert suggests that global warming is a serious 
problem, and that Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she actually agrees with 
Albert, but because she does not wish to seem, to Albert, to be ignorant or indifferent to 
human suffering and environmental protection. If Albert and Barbara agree that global 
warming is a serious problem, Cynthia might not contradict them publicly, and might 
even seem to share their judgment, not because she believes the judgment to be correct, 
but because she does not want to face the hostility or lose the good opinion of others. It is 
easy to see how this process might generate a cascade. Once Albert, Barbara, and Cynthia 
offer a united front on the issue, their friend David might be most reluctant to contradict 
them even if he thinks that they are wrong. In the actual world of group decisions, people 
are of course uncertain whether publicly expressed statements are a product of 
independent knowledge, participation in an informational cascade, or reputational 
pressure. It is reasonable to think that much of the time, listeners and observers overstate 
the extent to which the actions of others are based on independent information. 
 
Reputational cascades occur within all branches of government. Of course 
legislators are vulnerable to reputational pressures; that is part of their job. When elected 
representatives suddenly support legislation to deal with an apparent (sometimes not real) 
crisis, they are involved in a reputational cascade.174 Consider, for example, the rush, in 
July 2002, to enact measures to deal with corporate corruption.175 Undoubtedly many 
legislators had private qualms about the very legislation that they supported, and some of 
them probably disapproved of measures for which they nonetheless voted. So too with 
the unanimous (!) disapproval, by members of the United States Senate, of the court of 
appeals decision to strike down the use of the words “under God” in the pledge of 
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allegiance. 176 In both cases, some legislators were involved in a reputational cascade, 
repressing their private doubts in order to avoid injury to their reputations.  
 
2. Pluralistic ignorance and self-censorship. I have emphasized that in an 
informational cascade, the most serious problem is that the group fails to receive 
privately held information. Exactly the same problem arises in a reputational cascade, 
where the public, for a very different reason, is unable to learn what many people know 
and think. Here people silence themselves not because they believe that they are wrong 
but because they do not want to face the disapproval that, they think, would follow from 
expressing the view that they believe to be correct. The underlying problem here is 
pluralistic ignorance: ignorance, on the part of most or all, of what most people actually 
think.177 In the face of pluralistic ignorance, people can assume, wrongly, that others have 
a certain view, and they alter their statements and actions accordingly. 
 
Under certain conditions, this self-censorship is an extremely serious social loss. 
For example, Communism was able to sustain itself in Eastern Europe, not only because 
of force, but because people believed, wrongly, that most people supported the existing 
regime.178 The fall of Communism was made possible only by the disclosure of privately 
held views, which turned pluralistic ignorance into something closer to pluralistic 
knowledge.179 As we shall see, self-censoring can undermine success during war.180 
Reputational pressures also help fuel ethnic identifications, sometimes producing high 
levels of hostility among groups for which, merely a generation before, such 
identifications were unimportant and hostility was barely imaginable.181 And if certain 
views are punished, it is possible that unpopular views will eventually be lost to public 
debate, so that what was once “unthinkable” is now “unthought.”182 Views that were 
originally taboo, and offered rarely or not at all, become excised entirely, simply because 
they have not been heard. Here too those who do not care about their reputation, and who 
say what they really think, perform a valuable public service, often at their own 
expense.183  
 
Various civil liberties, including freedom of speech, can be seen as an effort to 
insulate people from the pressure to conform, and the reason is not only to protect private 
rights, but also to protect the public against the risk of self-silencing. A striking claim by 
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Joseph Raz clarifies the point: “If I were to choose between living in a society which 
enjoys freedom of expression, but not having the right myself, or enjoying the right in a 
society which does not have it, I would have no hesitation in judging that my own 
personal interest is better served by the first option.”184 The claim makes sense in light of 
the fact that a system of free speech confers countless benefits on people who do not 
much care about exercising that right. Consider the fact that in the history of the world, 
no society with democratic elections and free speech has ever experienced a famine185—a 
demonstration of the extent in which political liberty protects people who do not exercise 
it. Freedom of association is especially noteworthy here, because it allows people to band 
together in groups in which the ordinary incentive to conform might be absent or even 
reversed. Society in general might punish certain political views, but associations can be 
found in which those views are tolerated or even encouraged. The secret ballot can be 
seen in related terms.186 One advantage of the secret ballot is that it reduces informational 
pressures, leading the voter to express his own preference and to be less influenced by the 
views of others. (Recall the majority-rewarding version of the urn experiment.) But the 
more obvious advantage is that the voter can act anonymously and thus cast his ballot 
without fear of opprobrium. 
 
Just as informational cascades may be limited in their reach, there can be local 
reputational cascades—ones that reshape the public pronouncements of particular 
subgroups without affecting those of the broader society. When certain subgroups believe 
that nonexistent risks are actually quite serious, or that some hopeless medical treatment 
produces miracle cures, reputational cascades might well be involved, simply because 
skeptics do not speak out. Of course informational influences interact with reputational 
ones. South Africa, for example, has experienced the literally deadly phenomenon of 
“AIDS denial,” with prominent leaders suggesting that AIDS is not a real disease, but 
instead a conspiracy to sell certain drugs to poor people. In that case, a cascade did 
develop, but it was based mostly on transmission of alleged facts, not on fear of 
reputational harm.187 But if we emphasize reputational pressures, we can identity an 
important reason for unusual beliefs—about facts and values—among various 
communities of like-minded people. It is often tempting to attribute such differences to 
deep historical or cultural factors, but the real source, much of the time, is reputational 
pressure.  
 
Of course political leaders often play an important role in building those 
pressures.188 If leaders insist that something is true, or that the nation should pursue a 
certain course of action, some citizens might well be reluctant to dissent, if only because 
of a fear of public disapproval. Here as elsewhere, the result can be a serious social loss. 
And here again a strong system of civil liberties, and an insistence on making safe space 
for enclaves of dissenters, can be justified not as an effort to protect individual rights, but 
as a safeguard against social blunders. A market system aggregates and spreads 
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information better than any planner could possibly do.189 In the same way, a system of 
free expression and dissent protects against the false confidence and the inevitable 
mistakes of planners, both private and public.  
 
It would make little sense to say that cascades, in general, are good or bad. 
Sometimes cascade effects will overcome group or public torpor, by generating concern 
about serious though previously ignored problems. Sometimes cascade effects will make 
people far more worried than they would otherwise be and produce large-scale distortions 
in private judgments, public policy, and law. It is reasonable to speculate that the 
antislavery movement had distinctive cascade-like features, as did the environmental 
movement in the United States, the fall of Communism,190 and the anti-apartheid 
movement in South Africa; so too with Mao’s Cultural Revolution and the rise of Nazism 
in Germany. Typically cascades are quite fragile, precisely because people’s 
commitments are based on little private information. What I have emphasized here is the 
serious risk that social cascades can lead to widespread errors, factual or otherwise. 
 
D. Boundedly Rational Cascades 
 
Thus far the discussion has assumed that people are largely rational—that they 
take account, rationally, of the information provided by the statements and actions of 
others, and that they care, sensibly enough, about their reputation. The principal 
exception, suggested above, is that people may mistake a cascade for a large number of 
independent decisions. But it is well-known that human beings are “boundedly rational.” 
In most domains, people use heuristics, or mental short-cuts, and they also show 
identifiable biases.191 Indeed, following others can itself be seen as a heuristic, one that 
usually works well, but that also misfires in some cases.192 And for other heuristics and 
for every bias, there is a corresponding possibility of a cascade. 
 
Consider, for example, the availability heuristic, which has probably become the 
most well-known in law.193 When people use the availability heuristic, they answer a 
hard question about probability by asking whether examples come readily to mind.194 
How likely is a flood, an earthquake, an airplane crash, a traffic jam, a terrorist attack, or 
a disaster at a nuclear power plant? Lacking statistical knowledge, people try to think of 
illustrations.195 For people without statistical knowledge—which is to say most people—
it is hardly irrational to use the availability heuristic. The problem is that this heuristic 
                                                 
189 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 American Economic Review 519 (1945). 
190 See Kuran, supra note; Suzanne Lohmann, Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday 
Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991, 47 World Politics 42 (1994). 
191 For an overview, see Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich et 
al. eds. 2002); for a summary, see Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, U Chi L Rev(forthcoming 
2003). 
192 See Henrich, supra note, at 356; Goldstein et al., supra note, at 174. 
193 See, e.g., Roger Noll and James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 
19 J. Legal Stud 747 (1991). 
194 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, supra note 7, at 3, 11-14. 
195 Id. 
39 
can lead to serious errors of fact, in the form of excessive fear of small risks and neglect 
of large ones.196 And indeed both surveys and actual behavior show extensive use of the 
availability heuristic. Whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is greatly 
affected by recent experiences.197 If floods have not occurred in the immediate past, 
people who live on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance.198 In the 
aftermath of an earthquake, insurance for earthquakes rises sharply—but it declines 
steadily from that point, as vivid memories recede.199  
 
For present purposes, the key point is that the availability heuristic does not 
operate in a social vacuum. Whether an incident is “available” is a function of social 
interactions. These interactions rapidly spread salient illustrations within relevant 
communities, making those illustrations available to many or most. Should swimmers 
worry about shark attacks?200 Are young girls likely to be abducted?201 In both cases, the 
United States has recently seen “availability cascades,”202 in which salient examples were 
rapidly spread from one person to the next. Note that this process typically involves 
information. If some people use a recent assault to show that there is a serious risk of 
crime ten blocks north, or a recent airplane accident to show that it is unsafe to fly, their 
statements carry a certain authority, leading others to believe that they are true. And in 
the case of shark attacks and abduction of young girls, the media spread a few gripping 
examples, apparently providing information that was rapidly transmitted to millions of 
people. But reputational forces play a role as well. Much of the time, people are reluctant 
to say that an example is misleading and hence that others’ fears are groundless. Efforts 
at correction may suggest stupidity or callousness, and a desire to avoid public 
opprobrium may produce a form of silencing.  
 
Availability cascades are ubiquitous. Vivid examples, alongside social 
interactions, help account for decisions to purchase insurance against natural disasters.203 
Cascade effects explain the existence of widespread public concern about abandoned 
hazardous waste dumps (a relatively trivial environmental hazard).204 In more recent 
years, availability cascades spurred public fears not only of shark attacks and abductions 
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of girls, but also of the pesticide Alar, of plane crashes, and of shootings in schools in the 
aftermath of the murders in Littleton, Colorado.205 Such effects helped produce massive 
dislocations in beef production in Europe in connection with “mad cow disease”206; they 
help also to account for the outpouring of enthusiasm for regulation of accounting 
practices in the aftermath of the 2001 scandal involving Enron and other corporations.207  
My suggestion is not that in all or most of these cases, availability cascades led to 
excessive or inappropriate reactions. On the contrary, such cascades sometimes have the 
valuable effect of promoting public attention to serious but neglected problems. The 
suggestion is only that the intensity of public reactions is best understood by seeing the 
interaction between the availability heuristic and the cascade effects I have been 
emphasizing.208 The problem is that those interactions make some errors inevitable, 
simply because a heuristic, even if generally helpful, is bound to misfire in many cases. 
Here as elsewhere, dissent can be an important corrective. For organizations and 
governments, the question is how to make dissent less costly, or even to reward it, 
especially when dissenters benefit not themselves, but others. 
 
IV. Group Polarization 
 
Thus far I have been exploring how informational and reputational influences 
produce conformity and cascades. I have also identified factors that can increase or 
reduce the likelihood of both of these. When people are not bound by affective ties, the 
magnitude of both influences diminishes. When people define themselves as opposed to 
the relevant others, the direction of the influence might even shift. Greater information of 
course reduces the effects, and when people know that certain people are more informed, 
cascades are shattered. With these points in view, let us now turn to the phenomenon of 
group polarization, a phenomenon that contains large lessons about the behavior of 
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interest groups, religious organizations, political parties, juries, legislatures, judicial 
panels, and even nations.209 
 
A. The Basic Phenomenon 
 
What happens within deliberating bodies? Do groups compromise? Do they move 
toward the middle of the tendencies of their individual members? The answer is now 
clear, and it is perhaps not what intuition would suggest: Members of a deliberating 
group end up in a more extreme position in line with their tendencies before deliberation 
began.210 This is the phenomenon known as group polarization. Group polarization is the 
typical pattern with deliberating groups, having been found in hundreds of studies 
involving over a dozen countries, including the United States, France, and Germany.211 
 
It follows that a group of people who think that global warming is a serious 
problem will, after discussion, think that global warming is a very serious problem; that 
those who approve of an ongoing war effort will, as a result of discussion, become still 
more enthusiastic about that effort; that people who dislike the Rehnquist Court will 
dislike it quite intensely after talking with one another; that people who disapprove of the 
United States, and are suspicious of its intentions, will increase their disapproval and 
suspicion if they exchange points of view. Indeed, there is specific evidence of the latter 
phenomenon among citizens of France.212 When like-minded people talk with one 
another, they usually end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before 
they started to talk. It should be readily apparent that enclaves of people, inclined to 
rebellion or even violence, might move sharply in that direction as a consequence of 
internal deliberations. Political extremism is often a product of group polarization.213 
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There is a close relationship between group polarization and cascade effects. Both 
of these are a product of informational and reputational influences. A key difference is 
that group polarization refers to the effects of deliberation,214 and cascades typically do 
not involve discussion at all. In addition, group polarization does not necessarily involve 
a cascade-like process. Polarization can result simply from simultaneous independent 
decisions, by all or most individuals, to move toward a more extreme point in line with 
the tendencies of group members. 
 
To see the operation of group polarization in a legal context, let us explore in 
more detail the study of punitive intentions and punitive damage awards, referred to 
above.215 The study involved about 3000 jury-eligible citizens; its major purpose was to 
determine how individuals would be influenced by seeing and discussing the punitive 
intentions of others. Hence subjects were asked to record, in advance of deliberation, a 
“punishment judgment” on a scale of 0 to 8, where 0 indicated that the defendant should 
not be punished at all, and 8 indicated that the defendant should be punished extremely 
severely. After the individual judgments were recorded, jurors were sorted into six-
person groups and asked to deliberate to a unanimous “punishment verdict.” It would be 
reasonable to predict that the verdicts of juries would be the median of punishment 
judgments of jurors; but the prediction would be badly wrong.  
 
Instead the effect of deliberation was to create both a severity shift for high-
punishment jurors and a leniency shift for low-punishment jurors.216 When the median 
judgment of individual jurors was four or more on the eight-point scale, the jury’s verdict 
was above that median judgment.217 Consider, for example, a case involving a man who 
nearly drowned on a defectively constructed yacht. Jurors tended to be outraged by the 
idea of a defectively built yacht, and groups were significantly more outraged than their 
median members.218 But when the median judgment of individual jurors was below four, 
the jury’s verdict was typically below that median judgment.219 Consider a case involving 
a shopper who was injured in a fall when an escalator suddenly stopped.220 Individual 
jurors were not greatly bothered by the incident, seeing it as a genuine accident rather 
than a case of serious wrongdoing; and jurors were more lenient than individual jurors.221 
Here, then, is a clear example of group polarization in action. Groups whose members 
were antecedently inclined to impose large punishments become inclined toward larger 
punishments. The opposite effect was found with groups whose members were inclined 
toward small punishments. 
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B. Outrage 
 
When we consider the ingredients of punishment judgments, this finding has a 
large implication for people’s behavior both inside and outside the courtroom. 
Punishment judgments are rooted in outrage,222 and a group’s outrage, on a bounded 
scale, is an excellent predictor of the same group’s punishment judgments, on the same 
scale.223 Apparently people who begin with a high level of outrage become still more 
outraged as a result of group discussion. Moreover, the degree of the shift depends on the 
antecedent level of outrage; the higher the original level, the greater the shift as a result of 
internal deliberations.224 There is a point here about the well-springs of not only of severe 
punishment by jurors, mobs, and governments, but also of rebellion and violence.225 If 
like-minded people, predisposed to be outraged, are put together with one another, 
significant changes are to be expected.  
 
It should be easy to see that group polarization is inevitably at work in feuds, 
ethnic and international strife, and war. One of the characteristic features of feuds is that 
members of feuding groups tend to talk only to one another, fueling and amplifying their 
outrage, and solidifying their impression of the relevant events. Group polarization 
occurs every day within Israel and among the Palestinian Authority. Many social 
movements, both good and bad, become possible through the heightened effects of 
outrage226; consider the movement for rights for deaf people, which was greatly enhanced 
by the fact that the deaf have a degree of geographical isolation.227  
 
C. Hidden Profiles and Self-Silencing in Groups 
 
The tendency toward extreme movement is the most noteworthy finding in the 
literature on group polarization.228 But there is a neglected point, of special importance 
for my argument here: In a deliberating group, those with a minority position often 
silence themselves or otherwise have disproportionately little weight. The result can be 
“hidden profiles”—important information that is not shared within the group.229 Group 
members often have information but do not discuss it, and the result is to produce inferior 
decisions.  
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Consider a study of serious errors within working groups, both face-to-face and 
online.230 The purpose of the study was to see how groups might collaborate to make 
personnel decisions. Resumes for three candidates, applying for a marketing manager 
position, were placed before the groups. The attributes of the candidates were rigged by 
the experimenters so that one applicant was clearly the best for the job described. Packets 
of information were given to subjects, each containing a subset of information from the 
resumes, so that each group member had only part of the relevant information. The 
groups consisted of three people, some operating face-to-face, some operating on-line. 
Two results were especially striking. First, group polarization was common, as groups 
ended up in a more extreme position in accordance with the original thinking of their 
members. Second, almost none of the deliberating groups made what was conspicuously 
the right choice, because they failed to share information in a way that would permit the 
group to make an objective decision. Members tended to share positive information about 
the winning candidate and negative information about the losers, while also suppressing 
negative information about the winner and positive information about the losers. Their 
statements served to “reinforce the march toward group consensus rather than add 
complications and fuel debate.”231  
 
This finding is in line with the more general suggestion that groups tend to dwell 
on shared information and to neglect information that is held by few members. It should 
be unnecessary to emphasize that this tendency can lead to large errors.232 To understand 
this particular point, it is necessary to explore the mechanisms that produce group 
polarization. 
 
D. Why Polarization? Some Explanations 
 
Why do like-minded people go to extremes? There are several reasons.233 
 
1. Information. The most important, involving informational influences, is similar 
to what we have found in connection with conformity and cascades. The simple idea here 
is that people respond to the arguments made by other people—and the “argument pool,” 
in any group with some initial disposition in one direction, will inevitably be skewed 
toward that disposition.234 A group whose members tend to think that Israel is the real 
aggressor in the Mideast conflict will tend to hear many arguments to that effect, and 
relatively few opposing views. It is inevitable that the group’s members will have heard 
some, but not all, of the arguments that emerge from the discussion. Having heard all of 
what is said, there is likely to be further movement in the anti-Israel direction. So too 
with a group whose members tend to oppose affirmative action: Group members will 
hear a large number of arguments against affirmative action and a fewer number of 
arguments on its behalf. If people are listening, they will have a stronger conviction, in 
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the same direction from which they began, as a result of deliberation. An emphasis on 
limited argument pools also helps to explain the problem of “hidden profiles” and the 
greater discussion of shared information during group discussion. It is simply a statistical 
fact that when more people have a piece of information, there is a greater probability that 
it will be mentioned.235 Hidden profiles are a predictable result, to the detriment of the 
ultimate decision. 
 
2. Confidence and corroboration. The second explanation begins by noting that 
people with extreme views tend to have more confidence that they are right, and that as 
people gain confidence, they become more extreme in their beliefs. 236 The intuition here 
is simple: People who lack confidence, and who are unsure what they should think, tend 
to moderate their views. It is for this reason that cautious people, not knowing what to do, 
are likely to choose the midpoint between relevant extremes.237 But if other people seem 
to share your view, you are likely to become more confident that you are correct—and 
hence to move in a more extreme direction. In a wide variety of experimental contexts, 
people’s opinions have been shown to become more extreme simply because their view 
has been corroborated, and because they have been more confident after learning of the 
shared views of others.238 Note that there is an obvious connection between this 
explanation and the finding, mentioned above, that a panel of three judges of the same 
party is likely to behave quite differently from a panel with only two such judges. The 
existence of unanimous confirmation, from two others, will strengthen confidence and 
hence strengthen extremity.239 
 
3. Social comparison. A third explanation, involving social comparison, begins 
with the claim that people want to be perceived favorably by other group members, and 
also to perceive themselves favorably.240 Their views may, to a greater or lesser extent, 
be a function of how they want to present themselves. Once people hear what others 
believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position, to hold onto 
their preserved self-presentation. They may want to signal, for example, that they are not 
cowardly or cautious, especially in an entrepreneurial group that disparages these 
characteristics, and hence they will frame their position so that they do not appear as such 
by comparison to other group members.241 And when they hear what other people think, 
they might find that they occupy a somewhat different position, in relation to the group, 
from what they hoped; and they shift accordingly.242  
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For example, if people believe that they are somewhat more opposed to capital 
punishment than most people, they might shift a bit after finding themselves in a group of 
people who are strongly opposed to capital punishment, to maintain their preferred self-
presentation. The phenomenon appears to occur in many contexts.243 People may wish, 
for example, not to seem too enthusiastic, or too restrained in their enthusiasm for, 
affirmative action, feminism, or an increase in national defense; hence their views may 
shift when they see what other group members think. The result is to press the group’s 
position toward one or another extreme, and also to induce shifts in individual members. 
There is a great deal of support for this account of group polarization.244 
 
Note that an emphasis on social comparison gives a new and perhaps better 
explanation for the existence of hidden profiles and the failure to share certain 
information within a group. People might emphasize shared views and information, and 
downplay unusual perspectives and new evidence, simply from a fear of group rejection 
and a desire for general approval.245 In political and legal institutions, there is an 
unfortunate implication: Group members who care about one another’s approval, or who 
depend upon one another for material or nonmaterial benefits, might well suppress highly 
relevant information. Hence this account of group polarization is connected with the idea 
of reputational cascades, where blunders are highly probable.  
 
E. Skewed Debates 
 
In the context of punitive damage awards by juries, a particular finding deserves 
emphasis.246 Thus far my discussion of the relevant study has stressed how deliberation 
affected punitive intentions, measured on a bounded numerical scale. But jurors were also 
asked to record their dollar judgments, in advance of deliberation, and then to deliberate 
to dollar verdicts. Did high awards go up and low awards go down, as the idea of group 
polarization might predict? Not quite. The principal effect was make all awards go up, in 
the sense that the jury’s dollar award typically exceeded the median award of individual 
jurors.247 Indeed, the effect was so pronounced that in 27% of cases, the jury’s verdict 
was as high as, or higher than, the highest predeliberation judgment of jurors!248 There is 
a further point. The effect of deliberation, in increasing dollar awards, was most 
pronounced in the case of high awards. For example, the median individual judgment, in 
the case involving the defective yacht, was $450,000, whereas the median jury judgment, 
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in that same case, was $1,000,000.249 But awards shifted upwards for low awards as 
well.250  
 
Why did this happen? A possible explanation, consistent with group polarization, 
is that any positive median award suggests a predeliberation tendency to punish, and 
deliberation aggravates that tendency by increasing awards. But even if it is right, this 
explanation seems insufficiently specific. The striking fact is that those arguing for higher 
awards seem to have an automatic rhetorical advantage over those arguing for lower 
awards. A subsequent study of law students supports this finding, suggesting that given 
existing social norms, people find it easy, in the abstract, to defend higher punitive 
awards against corporations, and harder to defend lower awards.251 Findings of rhetorical 
advantage have been made in seemingly distant areas. Suppose that doctors are deciding 
what steps to take to resuscitate patients. Are individuals less likely to support heroic 
efforts than groups? Evidence suggests that as individuals, doctors are less likely to do so 
than groups, apparently because those who favor such efforts have a rhetorical advantage 
over those who do not.252  
 
Or consider the difference between individual behavior and team behavior in the 
Dictator Game, used by social scientists to study selfishness and altruism.253 In this game, 
a subject is told that she can allocate a sum of money, say $10, between herself and some 
stranger. The standard economic prediction is that most subjects will keep all or almost 
all of the money for themselves; why should we share money with strangers? But the 
standard prediction is wrong. Most people choose to keep somewhere between $6 and $8 
and to share the rest.254 The question here, however, is how is individual behavior is 
affected once people are placed in teams. The answer is that team members choose still 
more equal divisions.255 This result seems best explained by reference to a rhetorical 
advantage, disfavoring selfishness, even within a group that stands to benefit.256 
Apparently people do not want to appear to be greedy. Of course this outcome, and the 
effect of group influence, would change if the team in the Dictator Game had some 
reason to be hostile to the beneficiaries of their generosity. We can easily imagine a 
variation of the dictator game in which, for example, people of a relatively poor religious 
group were deciding how much to allocate to another religious group that was thought to 
be both hostile and far wealthier. In this variation, the rhetorical advantage might favor 
greater selfishness. 
 
But what produces a rhetorical advantage? The simplest answer points to 
prevailing social norms, which of course vary across time and place. Among most 
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Americans, current norms make it easier to argue, other things equal, for higher penalties 
against corporations for egregious misconduct, But it is possible to imagine 
subcommunities (corporate headquarters?) in which the rhetorical advantage runs the 
other way. In any case it is easy to envisage many other contexts in which one or another 
side has an automatic rhetorical advantage. Consider, as possible examples, debates over 
whether there should be higher penalties for those convicted of drug offenses, or whether 
tax rates should be reduced; in modern political debates, those favoring higher penalties 
and lower taxes have the upper hand. Of course there are limits on the feasible level of 
change. But when a rhetorical advantage is involved, group deliberation will produce 
significant shifts in individual judgments. Undoubtedly legislative behavior is affected by 
mechanisms of this sort, and it is likely that many movements within judicial panels can 
be explained in similar terms.  
 
Are rhetorical advantages unhelpful or damaging? In the abstract, this is an 
impossible question to answer, because shifts have to be evaluated on their merits.257 
Perhaps the higher punitive awards that follow deliberation are simply better. So too, 
perhaps, for the movements by doctors, taking more heroic measures, and by groups 
deciding how equally to spread funds. The only point is that such advantages exist; and it 
would be most surprising if they were always benign. 
 
F. More Extremism, Less Extremism 
 
Group polarization is not a social constant. It can be increased or decreased, and 
even eliminated, by certain features of group members or their situation.  
 
1. Antecedent extremism. Extremists are especially prone to polarization. It is 
more probable that they will shift and it is probable that they will shift more. When they 
start out an extreme point and are placed in a group of like-minded people, they are likely 
to go especially far in the direction with which they started.258 There is a lesson here 
about the sources of terrorism and political violence in general.259 And because there is a 
link between confidence and extremism, the confidence of particular members also plays 
an important role; confident people are more prone to polarization.260  
 
2. Solidarity and affective ties. If members of the group think that they have a 
shared identity, and a high degree of solidarity, there will be heightened polarization.261 
One reason is that if people feel united by some factor (for example, politics or religious 
convictions), dissent will be dampened. If individual members tend to perceive one 
another as friendly, likable, and similar to them, the size and likelihood of the shift will 
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increase.262 The existence of affective ties reduces the number of diverse arguments and 
also intensifies social influences on choice.263 One implication, noted above, is that 
mistakes are likely to be increased when group members are united mostly through bonds 
of affection and not through concentration on a particular task; it is in the former case that 
alternative views will less likely find expression.264 Hence people are less likely to shift if 
the direction advocated is being pushed by unfriendly group members.265 A sense of 
“group belongingness” affects the extent of polarization.266 In the same vein, physical 
spacing tends to reduce polarization; a sense of common fate and intragroup similarity 
tend to increase it, as does the introduction of a rival “outgroup.”267 
 
An interesting experiment attempted to investigate the effects of group 
identification.268 Some subjects were given instructions in which group membership was 
made salient (the “group immersion” condition), whereas others were not (the 
“individual” condition). For example, subjects in the group immersion condition were 
told that their group consisted solely of first-year psychology students, and that they were 
being tested as group members rather than as individuals. The relevant issues involved 
affirmative action, government subsidies for the theatre, privatization of nationalized 
industries, and phasing out nuclear power plants .The results were quite striking.269 
Polarization generally occurred. But there was the least polarization in the individual 
condition; polarization was greater in the group immersion condition, when group 
identity was emphasized. This experiment strongly suggests that polarization is highly 
likely to occur, and to be most extreme, when group membership is made salient.  
 
3. Exit. Over time, group polarization can be fortified because of “exit,” as 
members leave the group because they reject the direction in which things are heading.270 
If exit is pervasive, the tendency to extremism will be greatly aggravated. The group will 
end up smaller, but its members will be both more like-minded and more willing to take 
extreme measures; and that very fact will mean that internal discussions will produce 
more extremism still. If only loyalists stay, the group’s median member will be more 
extreme, and deliberation will produce increasingly extreme movements.  
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4. Informed members and facts. When one or more people in a group know the 
right answer to a factual question, the group is likely to shift in the direction of 
accuracy.271 If the question is how many people were on the earth in 1940, or the number 
of home runs hit by Hank Aaron, or the distance between Chicago and New York, and if 
one or a few people know the right answer, the group is likely not to polarize, but to 
converge on that answer. The reason is simple: The person who knows the answer will 
speak with confidence and authority, and is likely to be convincing for that very reason. 
Of course this is not inevitable; Asch’s conformity experiments show that social 
pressures can lead to errors even with respect to simple factual claims. But in many cases, 
group members who are ignorant will be tentative, and members who are informed will 
speak confidently. This is enough to ensure convergence on truth rather than polarization. 
Here there is a link between what prevents polarization and what shatters cascades: A 
person who knows, and is known to know, the truth. 
 
In this light it becomes easier to understand the outcomes of experiments that 
show a potential advantage of groups over individuals.272 One set of experiments 
involved two analytic tasks. The first involved a statistical problem, requiring subjects to 
guess the composition of an urn containing blue balls and red balls. (This experiment 
involved team decision-making and was not a test for cascade effects.) The other 
involved a problem in monetary policy, asking participants to manipulate the interest rate 
to steer the economy. People were asked to perform as individuals and in groups. The 
basic results for the two experiments were similar. Groups significantly outperformed 
individuals (and they did not, on balance, take longer to make decision). Perhaps most 
surprisingly, there were no differences between group decisions made with a unanimity 
requirement and group decisions made by majority rule. How can these results be 
explained? The experimenters do not have a complete account. An obvious possibility is 
that each group contained one or more strong analysts, who are able to move the group in 
the right direction. But a series of regressions, comparing the performance of the best 
individual players offers only mixed support for this hypothesis.273 It seems that in these 
experiments, group results were driven by the best points and arguments, which would be 
spread among the various individual players. Here we find a tribute to Aristotle’s 
suggestion that groups can do much better than individuals.274  
 
5. Equally opposed subgroups. Depolarization, rather than polarization, will be 
found when the relevant group consists of individuals drawn equally from two 
extremes.275 Thus if people who initially favor caution are put together with people who 
initially favor risk-taking, the group judgment will move toward the middle. Consider a 
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study276 consisting of six-member groups specifically designed to contain two subgroups 
(of three persons each) initially committed to opposed extremes; the effect of discussion 
was to produce movement toward the center. One reason may be the existence of 
partially shared persuasive arguments in both directions.277 Interestingly, this study of 
equally opposed subgroups found the greatest depolarization with obscure matters of fact 
(e.g., the population of the United States in 1900)—and the least depolarization with 
highly visible public questions (e.g., whether capital punishment is justified). Matters of 
personal taste depolarized a moderate amount (e.g., preference for basketball or football, 
or for colors for painting a room).278 Hence “familiar and long-debated issues do not 
depolarize easily.”279 With respect to such issues, people are simply less likely to shift at 
all, in part “because the total pool of arguments has long been familiar to all,”280 and 
nothing new will emerge from discussion.  
 
Compare in this regard an experiment designed to see how group polarization 
might be dampened.281 The experiment involved the creation of four-person groups, 
which, on the basis of pretesting, were known to include equal numbers of persons on 
two sides of political issues (whether smoking should be banned in public places, whether 
sex discrimination is a thing of the past, whether censorship of material for adults 
infringes on human liberties). Judgments were registered on a scale running from +4 
(strong agreement) to 0 (neutral) to –4 (strong disagreement). In half of the cases (the 
“uncategorized condition”), subjects were not made aware that the group consisted of 
equally divided subgroups in pretests. In the other half (the “categorized condition”), 
subjects were told that they would find a sharp division in their group, which consisted of 
equally divided subgroups. They were also informed who was in which group and told 
that they should sit around the table so that one subgroup was on one side facing the other 
group. In the uncategorized condition, discussion generally led to a dramatic reduction in 
the mean gap between the two sides, thus producing a convergence of opinion toward the 
middle of the two opposing positions (a mean of 3.40 scale points, on the scale of +4 to –
4). But things were very different in the categorized condition. Here the shift toward the 
median was much less pronounced, and frequently there was barely any shift at all (a 
mean of 1.68 scale points). In short, calling attention to group membership made people 
far less likely to shift in directions urged by people from different groups. 
 
**         **        **         **         **        **     ** 
 
My discussion of group influences—of conformity, cascades, and polarization—is 
now complete. I have emphasized many findings from social science, but I have tried at 
the same time to give a sense of how those findings bear on issues in law and politics. It 
should be clear that there is a long list of potential applications, and any set of selections, 
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from that list, is inevitably arbitrary. In the discussion that follows, I emphasize four 
areas in which an understanding of group influences helps to illuminate legal problems. 
The first involves law’s expressive function—the circumstances in which a mere 
statement, made by the law, is likely to affect people’s behavior. I draw a link among 
legal pronouncements, Milgram’s experimenter, and Asch’s unanimous confederates. 
The second involves the institutions of the American Constitution, based on the founding 
enthusiasm for the expression of diverse and dissenting views. I suggest that the 
American Constitution creates a deliberative democracy of a distinctive kind—a 
deliberative democracy that prizes heterogeneity. The third area involves the value of 
dissent in a place not always thought to benefit from it: the federal judiciary. Because 
judges are subject to conformity and cascade effects as well as group polarization, it is 
exceedingly important to promote ideological diversity within the federal courts. The 
fourth and final area involves affirmative action in higher education. Here I offer an 
ambivalent lesson, suggesting that racial diversity is, in some domains, unimportant for 
the exchange of (relevant) ideas, but that it is important in other domains, usually 
involved in both undergraduate and law school education.  
 
V. The Expressive Function of Law 
 
In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion of law’s expressive 
function—of the role of law in “making statements,” as opposed to regulating conduct 
directly through actual punishments for violations.282 In this Part, I make three 
suggestions. First, we can better understand the expressive function of law if we see 
certain legal enactments as offering signals about what it is right to do and about what 
other people think it is right to do. Second, a legal expression is most likely to be 
effective if violations are highly visible; visibility matters because people do not want to 
incur the wrath of others . Third, a legal expression is most likely to be ineffective if 
violators are part of a deviant subcommunity which rewards, or at least does not punish, 
noncompliance. In such cases, behavior within the subcommunity can counteract the 
effects of law. Each of these points can be closely connected with an understanding of 
conformity, cascades, and group polarization. We can thus use that understanding to see 
when government might bring about compliance without relying on public 
enforcement—and also when enforcement is likely to be indispensable. 
  
A. Law As Signal 
 
 Sometimes law is infrequently enforced, but there is automatic or near-automatic 
compliance.283 It is in this sense that law seems to have an expressive function, making 
statements and having effects merely by virtue of those statements. When effects occur, it 
is because the law offers signals on both the informational and reputational sides. If law 
is made by sensible people, and if law bans certain conduct, there is a good reason to 
presume that the conduct should be banned. And when law bans certain conduct, there is 
good reason to presume that other people think that the conduct should be banned. In 
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either case, sensible people have fresh reason to do what the law asks them to do. Of 
course the presumptions can be rebutted. Informed people might know that the law is 
asking people to do something senseless, or not to do something sensible. They might 
also know that most people, or most relevant people, actually reject the law. But if these 
cases are the exception rather than the rule, we can have a better understanding of why 
law will produce movement even if no one is enforcing it. 
 
 Consider, for example, an empirical study of bans on smoking in public places.284 
The simplest lesson is that people comply with those bans even though they are hardly 
ever enforced. The study finds that in three cities in California—Berkeley, Richmond, 
and Oakland—there were very few complaints about violations. In Berkeley, the 
responsible health department officials found it unnecessary to issue even a single formal 
citation, and no cases were referred for prosecution.285 In restaurants in Richmond, 
compliance was nearly 100%, with workplace compliance hovering between 75-85 
percent.286 The level of compliance was also extremely high in Oakland, with the 
exception of “certain restaurants in the Asian community where nearly all the patrons are 
smokers.”287 High levels of compliance were also found in workplaces, high schools, and 
fast-food restaurants.288 Other studies, involving as Cambridge and Winnipeg, Manitoba, 
similarly find that bans on public smoking are almost entirely self-enforcing.289 
 
This evidence suggests that a legal pronouncement can have the same effect as 
Asch’s unanimous confederates. When a law bans smoking in public places, the 
pronouncement carries information to the effect that it is wrong, all things considered, to 
smoke in public places. Equally important, the law suggests that most people believe that 
it is wrong to smoke in public places. And if most people think that it is wrong to smoke 
in public places, would-be smokers are less likely to smoke, in part because they do not 
want to be criticized or reprimanded. It follows that when law is effective when 
unenforced, an important reason is the possibility of private enforcement. If violations 
have a high degree of visibility, and risk the wrath of private enforcers, compliance might 
well become widespread. “In contrast to violations of laws against driving and drinking, 
narcotics use, and tax evasion, infractions of no-smoking rules in public places are 
relatively visible . . . to an almost omnipresent army of self-interested, highly motivated 
private enforcement agents—nonsmokers who resist exposure to tobacco smoke.”290 In 
some cases, the law might even be equivalent to Milgram’s experimenter, with a 
significant degree of authority even if no sanctions will be imposed. To the extent that the 
experimenter’s authority comes from a perception of expertise, the law is closely 
analogous.  
 
We might think of the underlying laws as exercises in norm management—and 
extremely inexpensive ones at that. They are inexpensive in the sense that taxpayer 
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resources are unnecessary to produce compliance. And in the best cases, expressive law 
might even start, shatter, or fuel a cascade. Once compliance begins, and is widely seen 
as such (especially from “fashion leaders”), there might well be compliance cascades, 
spurred by both informational and reputational influences. In the context of sexual 
harassment and smoking, law does seem to have caught a wave—and to have enlarged it 
significantly.291 A key point here is that the law was ahead, but not too far ahead, of the 
public at large. If the law were not ahead of the public, it would add nothing, and in that 
sense have no effect at all. But if the law moved too far ahead of the public, it could not 
be effective without aggressive enforcement activity.292 And a law that is too far ahead of 
the public is unlikely, for that very reason, to be aggressively enforced: Prosecutors and 
jurors are unlikely to punish people when the public does not support punishment.293 Law 
is most effective when it goes somewhat, but not too far, beyond people’s existing values. 
 
Thus far I have emphasized the situation from the point of view of the would-be 
violator. But a law has effects on private enforcers as well. In the absence of a legal ban, 
people who object to smoking in public places might well be timid about complaining, 
even if they find cigarette smoke irritating or worse. The same people are likely to be 
energized by a supportive enactment, which suggests both that they are right and that 
their beliefs are generally shared. With law on their side, they are less likely to appear to 
be noisy intermeddlers invoking a parochial norm. Someone who complains about 
speeding, or drunk driving, or smoking in public is far more likely to feel, or to be 
perceived as, having a legitimate complaint if the law requires the behavior they seek. 
Now of course this is not all of the picture. Among some people, the law has a high 
degree of moral authority, greatly exceeding the shared but unenacted view of many 
people.294 If this is the case, the law’s authority will extend well beyond that of Asch’s 
unanimous confederates, and probably beyond that of Milgram’s experimenter as well. 
But we cannot fully appreciate law’s moral authority without seeing it as intertwined with 
the informational and reputational factors that I have been emphasizing.  
 
B. The Preconditions of Norm Management 
 
 When will norm management work without significant enforcement activity? 
When will it fail? Begin with the case of a rational person who is considering whether to 
comply with the law. Among the relevant considerations are a) the likelihood of 
enforcement, b) the magnitude of the punishment in the event of enforcement, c) the 
reputational costs of violation, d) the reputational benefits of violation, e) the intrinsic 
benefits of compliance (perhaps a refusal to smoke will have health benefits), and f) the 
intrinsic costs of compliance (perhaps it is extremely pleasant to smoke, and extremely 
unpleasant not to smoke). By varying any of these variables, government might be able to 
achieve greater compliance. For present purposes, my emphasis is on c) and d). 
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To know whether a legal pronouncement will be effective, a key point involves 
the nature and extent of private enforcement. Recall that in the Asch experiments, the 
level of error is significantly decreased when people’s answers are given anonymously, 
and also when people are given a financial incentive to answer correctly. These findings 
suggest that seemingly modest changes in social context can counteract the pressure to 
conform. Consider in this light the close empirical association between visibility and 
compliance without enforcement. Parking in places reserved for the handicapped, and 
smoking in public, are easy to see and in both cases private enforcement is likely.295 By 
contrast, tax violations and sex offenses tend to be invisible, and hence violators need not 
worry so much, at the time of violation, about the risk of public opprobrium.  
  
 At the same time, law’s expressive function can be reduced or even counteracted 
if there is private support for violations. “People will defy dominant norms or laws, 
despite considerable risks of punishment, when they enjoy the social support of a ‘deviant 
subculture’ that continues to endorse the validity of condemned behavior.”296 In such 
cases, prospective violators are roughly in the position of peer-supported subjects in the 
Milgram experiment—at least if they have strong reason, based on principle or self-
interest, not to comply. And if the law is perceived as senseless, private support for 
violations can operate in the same way as a voice of reason in the Asch experiments. 
Hence it is possible to find “deviant subcultures” in which violations of law are 
effectively rewarded, through admiration and even a general increase in statute. It is also 
possible to find subcultures in which those who comply with the law can be heavily 
“taxed,” through ridicule, ostracism, or even violence. Drug use in the most obvious 
example; gang violence sometimes occurs simply because it is expected and rewarded by 
peers. Laws that are infrequently enforced will, in such communities, be highly 
ineffective, because private enforcement is lacking, and indeed private forces push hard 
against compliance. It is even possible to imagine noncompliance cascades; such 
cascades can involve information, as people see the violations of others, perhaps 
including dissident “fashion leaders.” They can also involve reputation, as people learn 
that in the relevant community, there will be no loss in the good opinion of others, and 
possibly some gain, for violations. 
 
In this light it is easy to see why there is a great deal of compliance with legal 
bans on parking in handicapped spaces and on smoking in public places, whereas there is 
far less compliance with legal bans on certain sexual behavior and (in certain domains) 
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the Internal Revenue Code.297 And it is also possible to understand the phenomenon of 
civil disobedience. When those engaged in civil disobedience are able to reach a critical 
mass, the law loses its authority, both as evidence of what should be done and as 
evidence of what (reasonable) people think should be done. The authority of the law is 
overcome by the authority of those engaged in disobeying the law. Here conformity 
pressures, cascade effects, and group polarization strongly favor disobedience. 
 
How might government handle the troublesome situations in which violations are 
both invisible and widespread? One possible remedy would be to let people know (if it is 
true) of the high current levels of voluntary compliance. Because people like to do what 
others do, large effects can come from reminders that most people obey the law or avoid 
harmful conduct. In fact there is evidence that taxpayers are far more likely to comply 
with the tax law if they believe that most people pay their taxes voluntarily, and far less 
likely to do so if they believe that noncompliance is widespread.298 A similar example 
may be drawn from college campuses. Students with a penchant for “binge drinking” 
tend to believe that the number of binge drinkers is higher than it is in fact. When 
informed of the actual numbers, they are less likely to persist in their behavior.299 These 
examples suggest that an understanding of group influences, and of the information 
conveyed by the acts of others, might be enlisted in efforts to reduce conduct that is 
unlawful or otherwise dangerous to self and others.  
 
VI. Institutions and Diversity 
 
 I now turn to issues of institutional design. As we have seen, the likelihood and 
consequences of conformity, cascades, and group polarization very much depend on 
institutional choices. Recall in particular that people are far more likely to reveal their 
own information if they are rewarded for a correct group decision rather than for a correct 
individual decision. In this Part, I begin with a brief note on the relationship between 
dissent and war, with the suggestion that conformity, and suppression of dissent, can 
undermine military preparedness. I also explore some of the institutions of the American 
Constitution, suggesting that the founders’ largest theoretical contribution consisted in 
their enthusiasm for diversity and the “jarring” of diverse views in government. Turning 
to contemporary issues, I discuss the role of group influences on federal judges and the 
dispute over “diversity” as a justification for affirmative action in higher education. 
 
A. Dissent and War 
 
I have suggested that an understanding of social influences increases appreciation 
of the social role of whistleblowers and dissenters, many of whom sacrifice their own 
self-interest and simultaneously benefit the public. Perhaps the most general point here 
involves the role of diversity and dissent within democratic institutions. Consider the 
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account of Luther Gulick, a high-level official in the Roosevelt Administration during 
World War II. In 1948, shortly after the Allied victory, Gulick delivered a series of 
lectures, unimaginatively titled Administrative Reflections from World War II, which 
offered, in some detail, a set of observations about bureaucratic structure and 
administrative reform.300 In a brief epilogue, Gulick set out to compare the warmaking 
capacities of democracies with those of their Fascist adversaries. 
 
Gulick began by noting that the initial evaluation of the United States, among the 
leaders of Germany and Japan, was “not flattering.”301 We were, in their view, “incapable 
of quick or effective national action even in our own defense because under democracy 
we were divided by our polyglot society and under capitalism deadlocked by our 
conflicting private interests.”302 Our adversaries said that we could not fight, and they 
believed what they said. And dictatorships did seem to have real advantages. They were 
free of delays, inertia, and sharp internal divisions. They did not have to reckon with the 
opinions of a mass of citizens, some with little education and little intelligence. 
Dictatorships could also rely on a single leader and an integrated hierarchy, making it 
easier to develop national unity and enthusiasm, to master surprise, and to act vigorously 
and with dispatch. But these claims, about the advantages of totalitarian regimes, turned 
out to be “bogus.”303  
 
The United States and its allies performed far better than Germany, Italy, and 
Japan. Gulick linked their superiority directly to democracy itself, and in particular “to 
the kind of review and criticism which democracy alone affords.”304 In a totalitarian 
regime, plans “are hatched in secret by a small group of partially informed men and then 
enforced through dictatorial authority.”305 Such plans are likely to contain fatal 
weaknesses. By contrast, a democracy allows wide criticism and debate, thus avoiding 
“many a disaster.” In a totalitarian system, criticisms and suggestions are neither wanted 
nor heeded. “Even the leaders tend to believe their own propaganda. All of the stream of 
authority and information is from the top down,” so that when change is needed, the high 
command never learns of that need. But in a democracy, “the public and the press have 
no hesitation in observing and criticizing the first evidence of failure once a program has 
been put into operation.”306 In a democracy, information flows within the government—
between the lowest and highest ranks—and via public opinion. Of course dissent can be 
muted in wartime, and for reasons I have discussed, this muting is a mixed blessing. If 
everyone seems to be on the same page, morale may be strengthened; but if disagreement 
is reduced, beneficial ideas—involving the nature, scope, justice, and wisdom of war—
may be absent. 
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With a combination of melancholy and surprise, Gulick noted that the United 
States and its allies did not show more unity than Germany, Japan, and Italy. “The 
gregarious social impulses of men around the world are apparently much the same, giving 
rise to the same reactions of group loyalty when men are subjected to the same true or 
imagined group threats.”307 Top-down management of mass morale, by the German and 
Japanese leaders, actually worked. Dictatorships were less successful in war, not because 
of less loyalty or more distrust from the public, but because leaders did not receive the 
checks and corrections that come from democratic processes. 
 
Gulick is offering a claim here about how institutions perform better when 
challenges are frequent, when people do not stifle themselves, and when information 
flows freely.308 Of course Gulick is providing his personal account of a particular set of 
events, and we do not really know if success in war is a product of democratic 
institutions.309 The Soviet Union, for example, fought valiantly and well, even under the 
tyranny of Stalin. But Gulick’s general theme contains a great deal of truth. Institutions 
are far more likely to succeed if they contain mechanisms that subject leaders to critical 
scrutiny and if they ensure that courses of action will be subject to continuing monitoring 
and review from outsiders310—if, in short, they use diversity and dissent to reduce the 
risks of error that come from social influences. 
 
B. Constitutional Design 
 
These points very much bears on the design of the American Constitution, which 
attempts to create a deliberative democracy, that is, a system that combines accountability 
to the people with a measure of reflection and reason-giving. 311 In recent years, many 
people have discussed the aspiration to deliberative democracy. Their goal has been to 
show that a well-functioning system attempts to ensure not merely electoral 
                                                 
307 Id. 
308 In a less impressionistic vein but to the same effect, see Harrington, supra note; Janis, supra note. 
309 Compare one of the most striking findings in the last half-century of social science: In the history of the 
world, no society with democratic elections and a free press has ever experienced a famine. See Amartya 
Sen, Poverty and Famines (1983). Famines are a product not merely of food scarcity, but of social 
responses to food scarcity. A democratic government, checked by the press, is likely to take all reasonable 
measures to prevent mass starvation, if only because it needs to do so to stay in office. At the same time, a 
free society, facing the risk of famine, is likely to have a great deal of information, at every stage, about the 
level of the emerging problem and the effectiveness of current or possible responses. If famine relief efforts 
plans “are hatched in secret by a small group of partially informed men and then enforced through 
dictatorial authority,” failure is far more likely. Or consider the problem of “witch-hunts” – mass 
movements, led by political leaders, against internal conspiracies. As the McCarthy period demonstrates, 
witch-hunts are hardly impossible in democracies. But they are far more likely in a system in which the 
public is able to check the leaders’ claims about internal disloyalty. If civil liberties are protected, and if 
information is permitted to flow, witch-hunts should be both less frequent and less damaging. See Vai-Lam 
Mui, Information, Civil Liberties, and the Political Economy of Witch-hunts, 15 J Law, Economics, and 
Org. 503 (1999). 
310 See Bradley C. Karkkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s 
Environmental Performance, 102 Colum L Rev 903, 948-62 (2002) (emphasizing need for and value of 
continuing monitoring of environmental performance). 
311 The best treatment is William Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (1998). 
59 
responsiveness, but also an exchange of reasons in the public sphere.312 In a deliberative 
democracy, the exercise of public power must be justified by reasons, not merely by the 
will of some segment of society, and indeed not merely by the will of the majority. Both 
the opponents and the advocates of the Constitution were firmly committed to political 
deliberation. They also considered themselves “republicans,” committed to a high degree 
of self-government.313 But deliberative democracies can come in many different forms, 
The framers’ greatest innovation consisted not in their belief in deliberation, which 
uncontested at the time, but in their fear of homogeneity, their enthusiasm for diversity, 
and their effort to accommodate and to structure that diversity. In the founding period, a 
large part of the nation’s discussion turned on the possibility of having that form of 
government in a nation with its heterogeneous citizenry.  
 
The antifederalists, opponents of the proposed Constitution, thought that this was 
impossible. Thus Brutus, an especially articulate advocate of the antifederalist view, 
spoke for the classical tradition when he urged: “In a republic, the manners, sentiments, 
and interests of the people should be similar. If this be not the case, there will be constant 
clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving 
against those of the other.”314 The advocates of the Constitution believed that Brutus had 
it exactly backwards. They welcomed the diversity and the “constantly clashing of 
opinions” and affirmatively sought a situation in which “the representatives of one part 
will be continually striving against those of the other.” Alexander Hamilton spoke most 
clearly on the point, urging that the” differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties in 
[the legislative] department of the government . . . often promote deliberation and 
circumspection; and serve to check the excesses of the majority.”315 From the standpoint 
of political deliberation, the central problem is that widespread error and social 
fragmentation are likely to result when like-minded people, insulated from others, move 
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everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks our partiality and widens our perspective; we are 
made to see things form the standpoint of others and the limits of our vision are brought home to us. . . . 
The benefits from discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators are limited in knowledge and 
the ability to reason. No one of them knows everything the others know, or can make all the same 
inferences that they can draw in concert. Discussion is a way of combining information and enlarging the 
range of arguments.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 358-59 (1971). The idea can be traced to Aristotle, 
suggesting that when diverse groups “all come together . . .  they may surpass – collectively and as a body, 
although not individually – the quality of the few best. . . . When there are many who contribute to the 
process of deliberation, each can bring his share of goodness and moral prudence; . . . some appreciate one 
part, some another, and all together appreciate all.” Aristotle, Politics 123 (E. Barker trans. 1972). Much of 
my discussion here has been devoted to showing why and under what circumstances this view might or 
might not be true. 
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in extreme directions simply because of limited argument pools and parochial influences. 
A Constitution that ensures the “jarring of parties” and “differences of opinion” will 
provide safeguards against unjustified movements of view. 
 
A similar point emerges from one of the most illuminating early debates, raising 
the question whether the bill of rights should include a “right to instruct” representatives. 
That right was defended with the claim that citizens of a particular region ought to have 
the authority to bind their representatives about how to vote. This defense might seem 
plausible as a way of improving the political accountability of representatives—and so it 
seemed to many at the time. But there is a problem with this view, especially in an era in 
which political interest was closely aligned with geography. In such an era, it is likely 
that the citizens of a particular region, influenced by one another’s views, might end up 
with indefensible positions, very possibly as a result of its own insularity, leading to 
cascade effects and group polarization. In rejecting the right to instruct, Roger Sherman 
gave the decisive argument:  
 
“[T]he words are calculated to mislead the people, by conveying an idea that they 
have a right to control the debates of the Legislature. This cannot be admitted to be just, 
because it would destroy the object of their meeting. I think, when the people have 
chosen a representative, it is his duty to meet others from the different parts of the Union, 
and consult, and agree with them on such acts as are for the general benefit of the whole 
community. If they were to be guided by instructions, there would be no use in 
deliberation.”316 
 
Sherman’s words reflect the founders’ general receptivity to deliberation among 
people who are quite diverse and who disagree on issues both large and small. Indeed, it 
was through deliberation among such persons that “such acts as are for the general 
benefit of the whole community” would emerge. 
 
Most important, the institutions of the Constitution reflect a fear of group 
influences, cascade effects, and polarization, creating a range of checks on ill-considered 
judgments that emerge from those processes. The most obvious example is bicameralism, 
designed as a safeguard against a situation in which one house—in the framers’ view, 
most likely the House of Representatives—would be overcome by short-term passions 
and even group polarization. This was the point made by Hamilton in endorsing a 
“jarring of parties” within the legislature. James Wilson's great lectures on law spoke of 
bicameralism very much in these terms, referring to "instances, in which the people have 
become the miserable victims of passions, operating on their government without 
restraint," and seeing a "single legislature" as prone to "sudden and violent fits of 
despotism, injustice, and cruelty."317 To be sure, a cascade can cross the boundaries that 
separate the Senate from the House; such crossings do occur. But their different 
compositions and cultures provide a significant safeguard against warrantless cascades. 
Here the Senate was thought to be especially important. Consider the widely reported 
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story that on his return from France, Jefferson called Washington to account at the 
breakfast-table for having agreed to a second chamber. "Why, asked Washington, "did 
you pour that coffee into your saucer?" "To cool it," quoth Jefferson. "Even so," said 
Washington, "we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it."318 
 
We can understand many aspects of the system of checks and balances in the 
same general terms. The duty to present legislation to the President protects against 
cascade effects within the legislative branch.319 Because law cannot operate against 
citizens without the concurrence of the legislative and executive branches, enacting and 
then enforcing the law, there is a further safeguard against oppresion. Federalism itself 
was, and remains, an engine of diversity, creating “circuit breakers” in the form of a 
variety of sovereigns with separate cultures. In the federal system, social influences may 
produce error in some states, and states can certainly fall into cascades.320 But the 
existence of separate systems creates some check on the diffusion of error.321  
 
Judicial power itself was understood in related terms, quite outside of the context 
of constitutional review; consider Hamilton’s account322: 
 
“But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the 
independence of judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill 
humours in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the 
private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the 
firmness of the judicial magistry is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and 
confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves the moderate the immediate 
mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the 
legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of an 
iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner 
compelled by the very motives of the injustice they mediate, to qualify their attempts.” 
 
Of course the Constitution’s explicit protection of freedom of speech, and its 
implicit protection of freedom of association,323 help to ensure spaces for diversity and 
dissent. In that way, they counteract some of the risks of mistake that stem from group 
influences. For present purposes, the analysis of free speech is straightforward, but it is 
worth emphasizing that freedom of expression diminishes the gap between a nation’s 
leaders and its citizens, and for that reason promotes monitoring of the former by the 
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latter.324 James Madison, the author of the first amendment, used this point to object to 
the whole idea of a “Sedition Act,” criminalizing certain forms of criticism of public 
officials. Madison urged that “the right of electing the members of the Government 
constitutes . . . the essence of a free and responsible government,” and that the “value and 
efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of 
the candidates for the public trust.”325 If group influences are kept in mind, one 
implication is that government might in some settings have a legitimate interest in 
introducing diversity of opinion into domains that that otherwise consist of like-minded 
people. The reason is simply to diminish the risks of error. If modern technologies allow 
people to sort themselves into congenial communities, there is a risk that people will be 
insulated from competing views.326 Perhaps government should be entitled to respond. Of 
course any such efforts, on government’s part, will introduce first amendment problems 
of its own.327  
 
Freedom of association presents some important wrinkles. An understanding of 
group polarization suggests that associational freedom can produce significant risks, 
above all because like-minded people might, by the laws of social interactions, end up in 
unjustifiably extreme directions. Society might well become fragmented as a result of 
“iterated polarization games,” in which groups of like-minded people—initially different, 
but not terribly different, from one another—drive their members toward increasingly 
diverse positions. Small differences in initial views might well be magnified, through 
social interactions, into very large ones.328 An advantage of this process is that serves to 
increase society’s stock of “argument pools”; but it also increases the likelihood of 
mutual suspicion, misunderstanding, and even hatred. At the same time, freedom of 
association helps to counteract the informational and reputational influences that might 
well lead people to fail to disclose information, preferences, and values. By allowing a 
wide diversity of communities, imposing pressures of quite different kinds, freedom of 
association increases the likelihood that at some point, important information will be 
disclosed and eventually spread.329  
 
Nothing in this brief account means that the American Constitution, as originally 
ratified or as now understood, contains the ideal institutions and rights for balancing 
diversity with other goals, including stability. Some people, for example, argue on behalf 
of proportional representation,330 either of demographic groups or of a large number of 
parties, and it is possible to understand those arguments as responsive to the goal of 
guaranteeing a wide range of ideas in government. Efforts to ensure that disadvantaged 
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groups are represented as such might be urged on this ground.331 In some nations, there 
have been serious attempts to ensure equal representation for women, in large part on the 
ground that without such representation, important points of view will be absent. There is 
much to be said about this large topic.332 But to anchor the discussion, I now turn to two 
more particular issues, both of considerable contemporary concern: diversity on the 
federal judiciary and affirmative action in higher education. 
 
C. Judges 
 
1. Data. Are judges subject to conformity effects? Are they likely to cascade? Do 
like-minded judges move to extremes? What is the effect of anticipated and actual 
dissents? For obvious reasons this is not an easy topic to investigate. But consider judicial 
behavior on the D.C. Circuit.333 A panel of three Republican judges is far more likely to 
strike down agency action, at the behest of industry, than a panel of two Republicans and 
one Democrat. At the individual level, group influences are at least equally striking: 
When sitting with two Republicans, a Democratic judge is more likely to vote to strike 
down agency action than is a Republican when sitting with two Democrats. It does not 
much matter whether the judge of a single party is actually persuaded or instead decides 
that it is simply not worthwhile to dissent publicly. In either case, the vote reflects social 
influences, in a process that is not entirely different from what is observed in the Asch 
experiments.334 
 
Several studies find a strong tendency toward more extreme results when a panel 
consists of judges from a single political party.335 The background fact is that when 
industry challenges an environmental regulation, there is an extraordinary difference 
between the behavior of a Republican majority and that of a Democratic majority. 
Republican majorities reverse agencies over 50% of the time; Democratic majorities do 
so less than 15% of the time.336 There are also significant findings of group influence. 
Judges’ votes are greatly affected by whether there is another judge, on that panel, 
appointed by a president from the same political party. A Republican judge is much more 
likely to accept an industry challenge if she has a Republican colleague on the panel. A 
Democratic judge is far less likely to accept such a challenge if she has a Democratic 
colleague on the panel.337 Hence a single Democratic judge, accompanied by two 
Republicans, votes in favor of industry challenges over 40% of the time; but when joined 
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by one or more Democrats, the Democratic judge votes in favor of such challenges less 
than 30% of the time.338  
 
By contrast, a single Republican votes in favor of industry challenges less than 
20% of the time.339 Remarkably, a single Republican, accompanied by two Democrats, is 
less likely to accept an industry challenge than a single Democrat, accompanied by two 
Republicans. This is a real testimony to the strength of group influences (and also judicial 
reluctance to dissent publicly, either because it can be difficult and time-consuming to 
produce a dissent or because dissenting can seem an antisocial act). It might seem 
reasonable to say that a Democrat, sitting with two Republicans, votes like a Republican, 
whereas a Republican, sitting with two Democrats, votes like a Democrat. This view is 
not entirely wrong, but it is misleading. The problem is that how a Democrat votes, and 
how a Republican votes, is very much a function of whether they are accompanied by one 
or two people from their own party, or none at all.340 For this reason, there is no single 
way, independent of group influences, that either a Republican or Democrat tends to 
vote—at least in the context of industry challenges to agency regulations. 
 
In a testimonial to group polarization, a panel of three Republican judges is far 
more likely than a panel of two Republicans and one Democrat to reverse an 
environmental decision when industry challenges that decision.341 In one period (1995 to 
2002), 71 percent of Republican votes, on all-Republican panels, accepted industry 
challenges.342 By contrast, 45 percent of Republican votes, on two-to-one Republican 
panels, accepted such challenges—and 37.5 percent of such votes did so on two-to-one 
Republican panels.343 In a earlier period (1986-1994), the corresponding numbers were 
80 percent, 48 percent, and 14 percent.344 In a still earlier period (1970-1982), 100 
percent of Republicans votes, on all-Republican panels, were in favor of industry 
challenges. By contrast, only 45 percent of Republican votes, on two-to-one Republican 
panels, were in favor of industry challenges—and only 26 percent of Republican votes, 
on Democratic-dominated panels, were in favor of such challenges.345  
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Aggregating this data, we can produce a broadly representative and nearly 
complete account of votes, within the DC Circuit, in environmental cases between 1979 
and 2002. A simple calculation shows that in all-Republican panels, Republicans voted to 
accept industry challenges 80 percent of the time; that in two-to-one Republican panels, 
Republicans voted to accept such challenges 48 percent of the time; and that in two-to-
one Democratic panels, Republicans voted to accept industry challenges only 27.5 of the 
time. And group polarization is hardly limited to Republican judges; it occurs among 
Democratic judges as well. When an environmental group is challenging agency action, a 
panel of three Democrats is more likely to accept the challenge than a panel of two 
Democrats and one Republican.346 The likelihood that a Democrat will vote in favor of an 
environmentalist challenge is highest when three Democrats are on the panel—and 
lowest when the panel has two Republicans.347  
 
A third study is more complicated.348 Under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chevron v. NRDC,349 courts are supposed to uphold agency interpretations of law so long 
as the interpretations are “reasonable.” But when do courts actually uphold such 
interpretations? The doctrine allows judges considerable room to maneuver, so that courts 
that are inclined to invalidate agency action usually can find a plausible basis for doing 
so. The real question is when they will claim to have found that plausible basis. The 
second study strongly suggests that group influences play a role and that the potential for 
a dissent, from a Democratic judge, is a strong deterrent to Republican judges who are 
inclined to invalidate agency action. As a background fact, note that the study finds an 
exceedingly strong influence, within the influential court of appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, of party affiliation on outcomes. If observers were to code cases very 
crudely, by taking account of whether industry or a public interest group is bringing the 
challenge, they would find that a majority of Republicans reach a conservative judgment 
54% of the time, whereas a majority of Democrats reach such a judgment merely 32% of 
the time.350  
 
For present purposes, the most important finding is that there is a dramatic 
difference between politically diverse panels, with judges appointed by Presidents of 
more than one party, and politically unified panels, with judges appointed by Presidents 
of only one party. On divided panels in which a Republican majority of the court might 
be expected, on broadly speaking political grounds, to be hostile to the agency, the court 
nonetheless deferred to the agency 62% of the time. But on unified panels in which an 
all-Republican panel might be expected to be hostile to the agency, the court upheld the 
agency’s interpretation only 33% of the time. Note that this was the only such finding in 
the data. When Democratic majority courts were expected to uphold the agency’s 
decision on political grounds, they did so over 70% of the time, whether unified (71% of 
the time) or divided (86% of the time). Consider the results in tabular form351: 
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 3–0 
Republican 
panel 
2–1 
Republican 
panel 
3–0 
Democratic 
panel 
2–1 
Democratic 
panel 
Uphold 
agency action 33% 62% 71% 86% 
Invalidate 
agency action 67% 38% 29% 14% 
 
It seems reasonable to speculate that the seemingly bizarre result—a 67 percent 
invalidation rate when Republican judges are unified—reflects group influences and in 
particular group polarization. A group of all-Republican judges might well take the 
relatively unusual step of rejecting an agency’s interpretation, whereas a divided panel, 
with a built-in check on any tendency toward the unusual or extreme outcome, is more 
likely to take the conventional route. A likely reason is that the single Democratic judge 
acts as a “whistleblower,” discouraging the other judges from making a decision that is in 
tension with the Supreme Court’s command to uphold agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes.352 And other factors are involved. When a court consists of a panel of 
judges with the same basic orientation, the median view, before deliberation begins, will 
be significantly different from what it would be with a panel of diverse judges. The 
argument pool will be very different as well. For example, a panel of three Republican 
judges, tentatively inclined to invalidate the action of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), will offer a range of arguments in support of invalidation and relatively 
few in the other direction—even if the law, properly interpreted, favors validation. If the 
panel contains a judge who is inclined to uphold the EPA, the arguments that favor 
validation are far more likely to emerge and to be pressed. Indeed, the very fact that the 
judge is a Democrat increases the likelihood that this will occur, since that judge might 
not think of himself as being part of the same “group” as the other panel members. 
(Recall that when people are connected by ties of solidarity, disagreement is all the less 
likely.) And because corroboration of opinion leads to greater confidence and hence 
extremity, it is not surprising that a panel of three like-minded judges would lead to 
unusual and extreme results. 
 
In this context, the effect is fortified by the possibility that the sole judge, finding 
himself outnumbered, might produce a dissenting opinion in public. To be sure, Supreme 
Court review is rare and in the general run of cases, the prospect of such review probably 
does not have much of a deterrent effect on courts of appeals. But judges who write 
majority opinions are usually not enthusiastic about having to see and to respond to 
dissenting opinions. And if the law actually favors the dissenting view, two judges, even 
if they would like to reverse the Environmental Protection Agency, might be influenced 
to adopt the easier course of validation. The evidence so suggests.353  
 
A glance at the table immediately above offers some countervailing data: A panel 
of three Democrats is not more likely than a panel with two Democrats to uphold agency 
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action in cases in which Democrats might be expected to want to uphold the agency. And 
in the context of a challenge from an environmental group, a Republican judge is not 
likely to vote differently if he is accompanied by two Democrats, one Republican, or two 
Republicans.354 But in some important domains, at least, a panel of three like-minded 
judges will indeed behave differently from a panel with two. It would be most interesting 
to learn what pattern would be observed in other contexts. What does the evidence show 
if, in criminal cases, we compare panels of three Democratic judges with panels 
containing two Democrats and one Republican? Are the three Democrats far more 
inclined to reverse a criminal conviction than a panel with one Republican? In any case 
the basic claim here can generate hypotheses about a wide range of areas. We might 
hypothesize, for example, that all-Republican panels would not be enthusiastic about sex 
discrimination claims, and that all-Democratic panels show far more sympathy for such 
claims. Perhaps all-Democratic panels would be particularly skeptical about claims that 
government regulation amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private property without 
just compensation. Perhaps all-Republican panels would show unusual enthusiasm for 
such claims. 
  
At this point a skeptic might note that lawyers make adversarial presentations 
before judges. Such a skeptic might insist that the size of the “argument pool” is 
determined by those presentations, not only and not even mostly by what members of the 
panel are inclined to say and to do. And undoubtedly the inclinations of judges are 
shaped, some of the time, by the contributions of advocates. But even if this is so, what 
matters, for purposes of the outcomes, is the inclinations of judges, whatever they are 
based on; and it is here that the existence of a single dissenter can make all the difference. 
In the punitive damage study discussed above, mock juries were presented with 
arguments from both sides, and polarization followed this presentation, as it has 
elsewhere.355 Notice in this regard that for polarization hypothesis to hold, it is not 
necessary to know whether judges spend a great deal of time offering reasons to one 
another. Mere exposure to a conclusion is enough.356 A system of simple votes, 
unaccompanied by reasons, should incline judges to polarize. Of course reasons, if they 
are good ones, are likely to make those votes especially persuasive. 
 
2. The normative issue. It remains to investigate the normative issues. If like-
minded judges go to extremes, should we be troubled? Is it good if a large effect is found 
from a single judge from a different party? More generally: Is there reason to attempt to 
ensure diversity on the federal courts? To promote a degree of diversity on panels? There 
is a widespread view that judges appointed by presidents of different political parties are 
not fundamentally different and that once on the bench, judges frequently surprise those 
who nominated them.357 The view is not entirely baseless, but it is misleading. Some 
appointees do disappoint the Presidents who nominated them, but the availability 
heuristic should not fool us into thinking that these examples are typical. Judges 
appointed by Republican presidents are quite different from judges appointed by 
                                                 
354 See Revesz, supra note, at 1755. 
355 Schkade, supra note, at 1150 and 1150 n. 44. 
356 See Robert Baron et al., supra note, at 74. 
357 See, eg, Jeffrey Rosen, New York Times Magazine; others. 
68 
Democratic presidents. “Partisanship clearly affects how appellate courts review agency 
discretion.”358  
 
But it seems difficult to evaluate the underlying issues without taking a stand on 
the merits—without knowing what we want judges to do. Suppose that three Republican 
judges are especially likely to uphold criminal convictions, and that three Democratic 
judges are especially likely to reverse those convictions. At first glance, one or the other 
is troubling only if we know whether we approve of one or another set of results. In the 
punitive damage study discussed above, the movement toward increased awards might be 
something to celebrate, not to deplore, if we conclude that the median of predeliberation 
awards is too low and that the increase, produced by group discussion, ensures more 
sensible awards. And if a view about what judges should do is the only possible basis for 
evaluation, we might conclude that those who prefer judges of a particular party should 
seek judges of that party, and that group influences are essentially beside the point. 
 
But the conclusion is too strong. In some cases, the law, properly interpreted, 
really does argue strongly for one or another view. The existence of diversity on a panel 
is likely to bring that fact to light and perhaps to move the panel’s decision in the 
direction of what the law requires. The existence of politically diverse judges, and of a 
potential dissent, increases the probability that the law will be followed. The Chevron 
study, referred to above, strongly supports this point.359 The presence of a potential 
dissenter—in the form of a judge appointed by a president from another political party—
creates a possible whistleblower who can reduce the likelihood of an incorrect or lawless 
decision.360 Through an appreciation of the nature of group influences, we can see the 
wisdom in an old idea: A decision is more likely to be right, and less likely to be political 
in a pejorative sense, if it is supported by judges with different predilections.  
 
There is a further point. Suppose that in many areas, it is not clear, in advance, 
whether the appointees of Democratic or Republican presidents are correct. Suppose that 
we are genuinely uncertain. If so, there is reason to favor a situation in which the legal 
system has both, simply on the ground that through that route, more (reasonable) 
opinions are likely to be heard. And if we are genuinely uncertain, there is reason to favor 
a mix of views merely by virtue of its moderating effect. In the face of uncertainty, 
sensible people choose between the poles.361  
 
3. An analogy. Consider an analogy. Modern law and policy is often made by 
independent regulatory commissions, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the 
Federal Communications Commission. Much of the time, such agencies act through 
adjudication. They function in the same fashion as federal courts. And under federal 
statutes, Congress has attempted to ensure that these agencies are not monpolized by 
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either Democrats or Republicans. The law requires that no more than a bare majority of 
agency members may be from a single party.362 An understanding of group influences 
helps explain this requirement. An independent agency that is all-Democratic, or all-
Republican, might move toward an extreme position, indeed a position that is more 
extreme than that of the median Democrat or Republican, and possibly more extreme 
than that of any agency official standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan membership 
can operate as a check against movements of this kind. Congress was apparently aware of 
this general point. Closely attuned to the policymaking functions of the relevant 
institutions, it was careful to provide a safeguard against extreme movements.  
 
Why do we fail to create similar safeguards for courts? Part of the answer must lie 
in a belief that unlike heads of independent regulatory commissions, judges are not 
policymakers. Their duty is to follow the law, not to make policy. An attempt to ensure 
bipartisan composition would seem inconsistent with the commitment to this belief. But 
the evidence I have discussed shows judges are policymakers of an important kind, and 
that their political commitments very much influence their votes. In principle, there is 
good reason to attempt to ensure a mix of perspectives within courts of appeals. 
 
Of course the idea of diversity, or of a mix of perspectives, is hardly self-defining. 
It would not be appropriate to say that the federal judges should include people who 
refuse to obey the Constitution, or who refuse to exercise the power of judicial review, or 
who think that the Constitution allows suppression of political dissent and racial 
segregation. Here as elsewhere, the domain of appropriate diversity is limited. What is 
necessary is reasonable diversity, or diversity of reasonable views, and not diversity as 
such. People can certainly disagree about what reasonable diversity entails in this context. 
All that I am suggesting here is that there is such a thing as reasonable diversity, and that 
it is important to ensure that judges, no less than anyone else, are exposed to it, and not 
merely through the arguments of advocates. 
 
4. The Senate’s role. These points cast fresh light on a much disputed issue: the 
legitimate role of the Senate in giving “advice and consent” to presidential appointments 
to the federal judiciary. Above all, an understanding of social influences suggests that the 
Senate has a responsibility to exercise its constitutional authority in order to ensure a 
reasonable diversity of view. The Constitution’s history fully contemplates an 
independent role for the Senate in the selection of Supreme Court Justices.363 That 
independent role certainly authorizes the Senate to consider the general approach, and 
likely pattern of votes, of potential judges. There can be no doubt that the President 
considers the general approach of his nominees; the Senate is entitled to do so as well. 
Under good conditions, these simultaneous powers would bring about a healthy form of 
checks and balances, permitting each branch to counter the other. Indeed, that system is 
part and parcel of social deliberation about the direction of the federal judiciary.  
 
                                                 
362 See, eg, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994). 
363 See David A. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 
101 Yale L.J. 1491 (1992). 
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Why might this view be rejected? It could be urged that there is only one 
legitimate approach to constitutional or statutory interpretation—that, for example, some 
version of originalism or textualism is the only such approach, and that anyone who 
rejects that view is unreasonable. For true believers, it is pointless to argue for diverse 
views.364 Diversity is not necessary, or even valuable, if we already know what should be 
done, and if competing views would simply cloud the issue. (In a scientific dispute, it is 
not helpful to include those who believe that the earth is flat.) Or it might be urged that a 
deferential role for the Senate, combined with natural political competition and cycles, 
will produce a sensible mix over time. I do not deny this possibility. My only suggestions 
are that a high degree of diversity on the federal judiciary is desirable, that the Senate is 
entitled to pursue diversity, and that without such diversity, judicial panels are will 
inevitably go in unjustified directions. 
 
D. Affirmative Action in Higher Education 
 
Countless educational institutions pursue the goal of diversity. Most of America’s 
large private and public institutions seek a wide range of views, faculty, and students. 
There are some prominent exceptions; some institutions pride themselves on a high 
degree of homogeneity.365 And here as elsewhere, the idea of diversity needs to be 
clarified. Colleges and universities do not make special efforts to include students who 
collect Britney Spears memorabilia, hate America, smell bad, or have low SAT’s. Such 
institutions are committed to diversity, but only to a certain degree and of a certain kind. 
It remains possible to urge, as many do, that they give excessive attention to diversity of 
some kinds and insufficient attention to diversity of other kinds. The only point I am 
making here is that they tend to be committed to diversity of a recognizable sort.  
 
There are many reasons for this commitment. One involves simple market 
pressures; a school that has different sorts of students is more likely to be able to attract 
good faculty and good students.366 Of course people’s preferences and values vary, and 
some people want to go to places that are relatively homogeneous. But this seems to be 
the exception rather than the rule.367 And there is another justification for diversity, one 
that has received considerable attention within courts368 and that is closely related to my 
topic here. The idea is that education is simply likely to be better if the school has people 
                                                 
364 Note, however, that even if it would be appropriate for all judges to share a certain approach, it is also 
desirable to have diversity with respect to the application of that approach. Textualists do not all agree with 
one another; there is internal diversity in the world of originalism. Diversity is appropriate here to ensure an 
airing of reasonable views. 
365 See the discussion of Brigham Young University in Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity (1999). 
366 Note that this justification is most unlikely to be legitimate as a constitutional matter. A public 
institution is not permitted to justify discrimination by claiming, or even showing, that many of its 
constituents call for it. Brown v. Bd. of Education itself requires that conclusion; see also Palmore v. 
Sadoti, 466 US 429, 441 (1984), suggesting that private “biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the 
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.” 
367 Recall the prior qualifications about the definition of diversity. Even apparently diverse institutions are 
homogenous in certain ways and along certain dimensions, and this is what students and faculty seem to 
prefer. 
368 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
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with different views, perspectives, and experiences. In the context of affirmative action, 
this justification was approved in Justice Powell’s decisive opinion in the Bakke case,369 
an opinion that has the unusual distinction of having settled, for a period of decades, the 
constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education without having been embraced 
by any other justice on the Supreme Court. My goal here is to offer a qualified defense of 
Justice Powell’s view. I urge that in some educational settings, racial diversity is 
important for ensuring a broad array of experiences and ideas, and that in those settings, 
narrowly tailored affirmative action programs should be constitutionally permissible. 
 
Justice Powell insisted that a diverse student body is a constitutionally acceptable 
goal for higher education.370 The central reason is that universities should be allowed to 
ensure a “robust exchange of ideas,” an interest connected with the first amendment 
itself.371 Justice Powell acknowledged that this interest seemed strongest in the context of 
undergraduate education, where views are formed on a large number of topics. But even 
in a medical school, “the contribution of diversity is substantial.”372 A medical student 
having a particular background, including a particular ethnic background, “may bring to a 
professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training 
of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital 
service to humanity.”373 Justice Powell also emphasized that doctors “serve a 
heterogeneous population,” and suggested that graduate admissions decisions are 
concerned with contributions that follow formal education.374  
 
Thus Justice Powell concluded that the crucial question was whether a race-
conscious admission program, giving benefits to people because they are members of 
racial minority groups, was a necessary means of promoting the legitimate goal of 
diversity. Here he reached his famous conclusion that racial or ethnic background could 
be a “plus” in the admissions decision, though quotas would not be allowed.375 For 
Justice Powell, a legitimate admissions program should be “flexible enough to consider 
all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of the applicant, 
and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily 
according to them the same weight.”376 Thus it would be acceptable to promote 
“beneficial educational pluralism” by considering a range of factors, including 
“demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to 
communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.”377 
 
  My central concern here is the principal378 basis for Justice Powell’s conclusion: 
                                                 
369 See 438 US 265 (1978 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
370 438 US at 311-12. 
371 Id. at 313. 
372 Id. 
373 Id. at 314.  
374 Id. 
375 Id. at 316-320. 
376 Id. at 317.  
377 Id. 
378 This is not the exclusive basis for Justice Powell’s opinion; he was also concerned with what will 
happen after graduation – with the possibility that members of minority groups will serve their 
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the value of ensuring a “robust exchange of ideas” in the classroom, and the legitimacy of 
promoting racial diversity in order to ensure that exchange. To understand the 
contemporary relevance of Justice Powell’s opinion, it is necessary to outline the recent 
developments in the constitutional principles governing affirmative action programs. The 
Court has now settled on the view that affirmative action programs, like all other 
programs embodying racial discrimination, should be subject to “strict scrutiny” from 
courts, and invalidated unless they are the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling state interest.379 It is also clear that past “societal discrimination,” meaning 
discrimination in the nation’s past, is not a legitimate basis for discrimination against 
whites.380 It is equally clear that narrow, remedial affirmative action programs are 
acceptable if they are specifically designed to correct for proven past discrimination by 
the institution that is acting affirmatively.381  
 
 What remains unclear is when, if ever, a public institution is permitted to justify 
affirmative action by reference to “forward-looking” justifications, not involving a 
remedy for past discrimination.382 A state might, for example, try to defend affirmative 
action in hiring police by urging that a police force will simply be more effective if it 
contains African-Americans among others—especially in a community that contains 
people of multiple races.383 Justice Powell was really offering a similar claim about 
higher education: Whether or not a college or university has itself discriminated against 
African-Americans or others, it should permitted to discriminate in favor of them if it is 
doing so as a means of ensuring a “robust exchange of ideas.” But current justices have 
given conflicting signals about the legitimacy and strength of forward-looking 
justifications.384  
                                                                                                                                                 
communities, in a way that confers significant social benefits on populations that might otherwise be 
underserved. Id. For evidence that this does happen, see John Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of the 
River (1998). 
379 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 US 200 
(1995). 
380 City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469, 477 (1989). 
381 United States v. Paradise, 480 US 149 (1987); Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. 
Cleveland, 478 US 616 (1987). 
382 For general discussion, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative 
Action Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 96 (1986): "Public and private employers might choose to implement 
affirmative action for many reasons other than to purge their own past sins of discrimination. The Jackson 
school board, for example, said it had done so in part to improve the quality of education in Jackson -- 
whether by improving black students' performance or by dispelling for black and white students alike any 
idea that white supremacy governs our social institutions. Other employers might advance different 
forward-looking reasons for affirmative action: improving their services to black constituencies, averting 
racial tension over the allocation of jobs in a community, or increasing the diversity of a work force, to 
name but a few examples. Or they might adopt affirmative action simply to eliminate from their operations 
all de facto embodiment of a system of racial caste. All of these reasons aspire to a racially integrated 
future, but none reduces to 'racial balancing for its own sake.'" 
383 Id. 
384 For one view, see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987) (Stevens, concurring): 
“Instead of retroactively scrutinizing his own or society's possible exclusions of minorities in the past to 
determine the outer limits of a valid affirmative-action program -- or indeed, any particular affirmative-
action decision -- in many cases the employer will find it more appropriate to consider other legitimate 
reasons to give preferences to members of underrepresented groups. Statutes enacted for the benefit of 
minority groups should not block these forward-looking considerations.” For a contrasting view, see Justice 
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 There can be no doubt that universities are permitted to promote diversity and 
dissent by seeking a mix of faculty and students. Efforts of this kind are pervasive; this is 
what most admissions offices try to do. To be sure, some serious free speech issues might 
be raised if an admissions office discriminates in favor of, or against, particular points of 
view.385 But even if public institutions are barred from pursuing diversity of ideas by 
discriminating directly against some points of view, such institutions are surely 
permitted, without offending the first amendment, to seek a variety of backgrounds and 
experiences, in the hope that better discussions will result. If Justice Powell is right, 
affirmative action programs can be similarly justified. The simple idea here is that diverse 
populations are likely to increase the range of thoughts and perspectives, and to reduce 
the risks of conformity, cascades, and polarization associated with group influences.386 
We have seen that on the judiciary, judges with diverse views can act as 
“whistleblowers,” correcting ill-considered views of the law. In educational institutions, a 
high degree of diversity, including racial diversity, often has the same effect. A racially 
uniform class is all too likely to polarize to an unjustified position, simply because 
students’ antecedent views are not subject to critical scrutiny. 
 
  For example, we can easily imagine all-white classrooms, discussing the issue of 
racial profiling, in which the absence of racial diversity is a serious problem. Those who 
have not had bad experiences, as a result of such profiling, will lack crucial information. 
Return here to Justice O’Connor’s comments on Justice Marshall: “Justice Marshall 
brought a special perspective. . . . His was the mouth of a man who knew the anguish of 
the silenced and gave them a voice. . . . I have been perhaps most personally affected by 
Justice Marshall as a raconteur . . . . Occasionally, at Conference meetings, I still catch 
myself looking expectantly for his raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just 
once more, another story that would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the 
world.”387 What was true for Justice O’Connor is true for white students in many 
educational settings. In the context of racial profiling, and in many other imaginable 
cases, a degree of racial diversity is likely to bring to bear valuable information and 
perspectives. These may change how the group sees the world, whether or not it leads to 
                                                                                                                                                 
O'Connor, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 US 547, 612 (1990), joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, 
and Kennedy: “Modern equal protection has recognized only one [compelling state] interest: remedying the 
effects of racial discrimination. The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly 
not a compelling interest. It is simply too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate 
basis for employing racial classifications.” 
385 I am unaware of any first amendment challenge to a university’s efforts to promote diversity by 
promoting a range of views, even though such efforts would necessarily involve discrimination against 
some views and in favor of others. But there are some hard questions lurking here. One set of questions 
involve the sheer difficulty of proof: In a case in which a student is or is not denied admission, the 
applicant’s political view will undoubtedly be one of a range of factors, and it will be hard to isolate, in a 
challenge, point of view as the decisive factor. In a case of discharge or suspension as a result of political 
view, there would indeed be a constitutional problem. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 US 563, 568 
(1968). 
386 For supportive evidence, see Patricia Gurin, Reports Submitted on Behalf of the University of Michigan: 
the Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 Mich J Race & Law 363 (1999). 
387 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Reconteur, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1217, 
1217, 1220 (1992). 
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a different conclusion on the merits. 
 
  To say this is of course not to make the absurd claim that white people all agree 
with one another about racial profiling, or that African-Americans have the same 
experiences and opinions about that complex issue. And in light of the fact that members 
of all races contain people with a range of both favorable and unfavorable views about 
racial profiling, it would be possible to respond that any problem, if it exists, is not 
because the group is all-white, but if and because its members begin with a uniform view 
of racial profiling. And if this is so, what, if anything, is added by promoting diversity not 
of views but of racial background? The answer must be that African-Americans, by virtue 
of their experience, are able to add something to the discussion as such. And this seems 
far from implausible. If students need to know something about the magnitude and the 
experience of racial profiling, those who have been subject to such profiling will be able 
to offer novel insights. And if African-Americans do, in fact, have an unusually high 
degree of hostility to racial profiling, that is by itself a point worthwhile to know and to 
try to understand. So too if they do not show such hostility. Of course supplemental 
readings could be used to expose people to diverse views. The value of diversity lies not 
simply in learning about facts, but also in seeing a range of perspectives, including the 
emotions attached to them—and in being in the actual physical presence of those who 
have those perspectives, and perhaps cannot be easily dismissed. 
 
 These points might be used by a purportedly nondiscriminatory institution to 
defend a set of policies designed to ensure a reasonable diversity of view in classroom 
discussions. Because of the importance of a wide range of ideas to the educational 
enterprise, the goal seems both legitimate and compelling. Are affirmative action 
programs the least restrictive means of promoting that goal? The answer depends on the 
nature of those programs. It is easy to imagine cautious efforts, using race as a factor, in 
which the “least restrictive means” test is indeed satisfied.388 And that point is sufficient 
to suggest that Justice Powell’s approach is essentially correct. 
 
 To be sure, the same arguments about the importance of diverse views might be 
enlisted very broadly, and in circumstances that might seem unattractive. Imagine, for 
example, an effort, by a mostly African-American university, to point to the need for 
diversity as a way of defending discrimination against African-Americans and in favor of 
whites. Such a university might claim that it wants significant representation by whites in 
order to reduce the risks from group influences and to improve the quality of discussion. 
It does indeed follow, from what I have said thus far, that this argument is legitimate. A 
classroom that is entirely African-American might well suffer from conformity effects 
and polarization; and a educational institution might want to correct the situation. If 
courts should be suspicious of the argument in this context, it is because they do not trust 
the sincerity of those who make it. Courts might believe that the reference to diversity is 
actually a pretext for an illicit discriminatory motive. But it is easy to imagine cases in 
which diversity is the real concern and no pretext is involved.  
                                                 
388 This was the conclusion of the court of appeals about the program used by the University of Michigan 
Law School. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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 There is a further complexity. Suppose that a university claims that it is pursuing 
the goal of high-quality education. Suppose that it insists that its admissions policies, 
which place a premium on many forms of diversity, are a legitimate means of pursuing 
that goal. Such a university might well be willing to discriminate in favor of members of 
racial minorities—and might well claim that this form of discrimination is part of the 
neutral pursuit of high-quality education. Is this illegitimate? Outside the context of 
affirmative action, the Court has come very close to holding that it is.389 In making 
decisions about child custody, courts are prohibited from taking account of the possible 
prejudice to be faced by children of racially mixed couples. The prohibition applies even 
if it is defended as part of a neutral mechanism for promoting the welfare of the child.390 
A racially-based system of child custody cannot be justified on the ground that in light of 
existing social values, children do better in a family that is all-white or all-African-
American. This decision suggests that an institution is not permitted to defend otherwise 
illegitimate discrimination by suggesting that it is neutrally pursuing a more abstract 
goal.391 But I am not claiming here that affirmative action fails to count as discrimination. 
I am urging instead that affirmative action can be adequately justified, in some contexts, 
as a way of ensuring that educational institutions do what they are supposed to do. 
 
 It is important to emphasize the narrowness of the argument I am making. In some 
cases, racial diversity is important for improving the educational process within the 
relevant school. But in some cases, the claim seems extremely weak. Would a 
mathematics class, or a course in physics, be improved if it contained a degree of racial 
diversity? This seems unlikely. In principle, I do not believe that courts should use the 
Constitution to scrutinize affirmative action programs with great care.392 But the law is 
otherwise, and if courts are going to do so, they should not offer a blanket ruling for or 
against a diversity rationale in higher education. They should accept that rationale in the 
context of undergraduate education, but not for programs for which racial diversity is not 
necessary to promote a “robust exchange of ideas.” In the context of law school, the 
centrality of racial issues to important aspects of legal education should be enough to 
allow narrowly tailored affirmative action programs to survive constitutional scrutiny.393 
 
Conclusion 
 
Human beings pay close attention to the informational and reputational signals 
sent by others. These signals produce conformity, even in cases in which many people 
have reason to believe, on the basis of their private information, that others are mistaken 
or worse. Informational and reputational influences also produce cascades, in which 
people do not rely on, and fail to disclose, the information that they themselves have. 
Cascades and errors occur spontaneously when people rationally take account of the 
                                                 
389 See Palmore v. Sadoti, 466 US 429 (1984). 
390 See id. 
391 On some of the complexities here, see David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Supreme 
Court Review 99. 
392 See Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (2002). 
393 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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decisions and statements of their predecessors. Errors are magnified when people are 
rewarded for conformity—and minimized when people are rewarded, not for correct 
individual decisions, but for correct decisions at the group level.  
 
Cascades, like conformity, are not a problem in themselves. Sometimes cascades 
produce good outcomes, at least compared to a situation in which people rely solely on 
their own information. The real problem is that when cascades are occurring, people do 
not disclose information from which others would benefit. The result is that both 
individuals and groups can blunder, sometimes catastrophically. Institutions involved in 
making, enforcing, and interpreting the law are subject to conformity and cascade effects. 
The executive branch has been shown to blunder as a result.394 We have seen that within 
courts, precedential cascades are highly likely, especially in complex areas; and in such 
areas, cascades tend to be both self-perpetuating and self-insulating. 
 
The general lesson is clear. It is extremely important to devise institutions that 
attempt to promote disclosure of private views and private information. Institutions that 
reward conformity are prone to failure to the extent that they do not do that; institutions 
are far more likely to prosper if they create a norm of openness and dissent. The point 
very much bears on the risks of group polarization. Groups of like-minded people are 
likely to go to extremes, simply because of limited argument pools and reputational 
considerations. The danger is that the resulting movements in opinion will be unjustified. 
It is extremely important to create “circuit breakers”395 and to devise institutional 
arrangements that will serve to counteract movements that could not be supported if 
people had a wider range of information. 
 
These points have implications for numerous issues in law and policy. I have 
focused on a small subset of those issues here. We have seen that an appreciation of 
social influences casts new light on the expressive function of law. Simply by virtue of 
what it says, and even if it is rarely enforced, law can affect the behavior of those who are 
unsure whether to engage in certain conduct—and also the behavior of those who are 
unsure whether to challenge those who engage in that conduct. Bans on smoking in 
public and on sexual harassment are cases in point. Law’s effectiveness, in this regard, 
lies in its power to give a signal about what it is right to do, and also to dissipate 
pluralistic ignorance, by providing information about what other people think that it is 
right to do. A legal enactment can operate in the same fashion as Asch’s confederates and 
Milgram’s experimenter. Because people care about the reactions of others, law’s 
expressive function will be heightened if the relevant conduct is visible; bans on smoking 
in public places are an obvious example. For the same reason, that function will be 
weakened if prospective law-breakers live in a supportive subcommunity; consider bans 
on the use of narcotics. With an understanding of social influences, we can therefore 
make some predictions about when law is likely to be effective merely by virtue of what 
it says—and about when law will be ineffective unless it is accompanied by vigorous 
enforcement activity.  
 
                                                 
394 See Janis, Groupthink, supra note, for a collection of examples. 
395 See Eric Posner, supra note. 
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I have suggested that many of the Constitution’s institutions serve to reduce the 
likelihood of bad consequences from conformity, cascades, and group polarization. Such 
institutions increase the likelihood that important information, and alternative points of 
view, will receive a public airing. The system of bicameralism is the most obvious 
example, producing a system in which lawmaking is done by two institutions with 
different cultures, thus creating a potential check on unjustified movements. I have also 
urged that the framers’ most distinctive contribution consisted not in their endorsement of 
deliberative democracy, which was uncontroversial, but in their commitment to 
heterogeneity in government, seeing (in Hamilton’s words) the “jarring of parties” as a 
method for “promoting deliberation.”  
 
More controversially, I have suggested that an understanding of social influences 
suggests the importance of ensuring a high degree of diversity on the federal bench. It is 
foolish to pretend that Republican appointees do not, as a class, differ from Democratic 
appointees; and we have reason to appreciate the value, on any panel, of having a 
potential “whistleblower,” in the form of one judge of a different party from the other 
two. Of course judges are rarely lawless, but a group of like-minded judges is prone to go 
to extremes. An appreciation of social influences on belief and behavior also supports the 
legitimacy of efforts to promote racial diversity in higher education, at least where such 
diversity is likely to improve learning. 
 
Even if occasionally alarming, much of the behavior discussed here attests to the 
reasonableness and good sense of ordinary people. In the face of doubt, we do well to pay 
attention to the views of others.396 After all, they might know better than we do. It is 
prudent to be cautious about challenging other people, not only because they might be 
right, but also because people do not always like to be challenged. Even in the most 
freedom-loving societies, people dissent at their peril. A reluctance to disagree is not 
merely prudent; it is often courteous too. But conformity creates serious dangers. 
Behavior that is sensible, prudent, and courteous is likely to lead individuals and societies 
to blunder, simply because people fail to learn about facts or opinions from which they 
would benefit.  
 
It is usual to think that those who conform are serving the general interest and that 
dissenters are antisocial, even selfish. In a way this is true. In some settings, conformists 
strengthen social bonds, whereas dissenters imperil them, or at least introduce tension. 
But in an important respect, the usual thought has things backwards. Much of the time, it 
is in the individual’s interest to follow the crowd, but in the social interest for the 
individual to say and do what he thinks best. Well-functioning systems of law and 
politics take steps to discourage conformity and to promote dissent, partly to protect the 
rights of dissenters, but mostly to protect interests of their own. 
 
 
 
                                                 
396 Note the suggestion, in Goldstein et al., supra note, at 174, that conformity operates as a sensible 
heuristic, one that often works well but that sometimes misfires, see Henrich et al., supra note, at 356-57. 
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